Jörg Henkel

Jörg Henkel, Hai Li, Anand Raghunathan et al.

Approximate computing (AxC) has been long accepted as a design alternative for efficient system implementation at the cost of relaxed accuracy requirements. Despite the AxC research activities in various application domains, AxC thrived the past decade when it was applied in Machine Learning (ML). The by definition approximate notion of ML models but also the increased computational overheads associated with ML applications-that were effectively mitigated by corresponding approximations-led to a perfect matching and a fruitful synergy. AxC for AI/ML has transcended beyond academic prototypes. In this work, we enlighten the synergistic nature of AxC and ML and elucidate the impact of AxC in designing efficient ML systems. To that end, we present an overview and taxonomy of AxC for ML and use two descriptive application scenarios to demonstrate how AxC boosts the efficiency of ML systems.

Jeferson Gonzalez-Gomez, Jose Alejandro Ibarra-Campos, Jesus Yamir Sandoval-Morales et al.

Covert channel attacks have been continuously studied as severe threats to modern computing systems. Software-based covert channels are a typically hard-to-detect branch of these attacks, since they leverage virtual resources to establish illegitimate communication between malicious actors. In this work, we present MeMoir: a novel software-driven covert channel that, for the first time, utilizes memory usage as the medium for the channel. We implemented the new covert channel on two real-world platforms with different architectures: a general-purpose Intel x86-64-based desktop computer and an ARM64-based embedded system. Our results show that our new architecture- and hardware-agnostic covert channel is effective and achieves moderate transmission rates with very low error. Moreover, we present a real use-case for our attack where we were able to communicate information from a Hyper-V virtualized enviroment to a Windows 11 host system. In addition, we implement a machine learning-based detector that can predict whether an attack is present in the system with an accuracy of more than 95% with low false positive and false negative rates by monitoring the use of system memory. Finally, we introduce a noise-based countermeasure that effectively mitigates the attack while inducing a low power overhead in the system compared to other normal applications.