Alan Cooney

Asa Cooper Stickland, Jan Michelfeit, Arathi Mani et al.

LLM-based software engineering agents are increasingly used in real-world development tasks, often with access to sensitive data or security-critical codebases. Such agents could intentionally sabotage these codebases if they were misaligned. We investigate asynchronous monitoring, in which a monitoring system reviews agent actions after the fact. Unlike synchronous monitoring, this approach does not impose runtime latency, while still attempting to disrupt attacks before irreversible harm occurs. We treat monitor development as an adversarial game between a blue team (who design monitors) and a red team (who create sabotaging agents). We attempt to set the game rules such that they upper bound the sabotage potential of an agent based on Claude 4.1 Opus. To ground this game in a realistic, high-stakes deployment scenario, we develop a suite of 5 diverse software engineering environments that simulate tasks that an agent might perform within an AI developer's internal infrastructure. Over the course of the game, we develop an ensemble monitor that achieves a 6% false negative rate at 1% false positive rate on a held out test environment. Then, we estimate risk of sabotage at deployment time by extrapolating from our monitor's false negative rate. We describe one simple model for this extrapolation, present a sensitivity analysis, and describe situations in which the model would be invalid. Code is available at: https://github.com/UKGovernmentBEIS/async-control.

Tomek Korbak, Mikita Balesni, Elizabeth Barnes et al. · deepmind

AI systems that "think" in human language offer a unique opportunity for AI safety: we can monitor their chains of thought (CoT) for the intent to misbehave. Like all other known AI oversight methods, CoT monitoring is imperfect and allows some misbehavior to go unnoticed. Nevertheless, it shows promise and we recommend further research into CoT monitorability and investment in CoT monitoring alongside existing safety methods. Because CoT monitorability may be fragile, we recommend that frontier model developers consider the impact of development decisions on CoT monitorability.

Bilal Chughtai, Alan Cooney, Neel Nanda

How do transformer-based large language models (LLMs) store and retrieve knowledge? We focus on the most basic form of this task -- factual recall, where the model is tasked with explicitly surfacing stored facts in prompts of form `Fact: The Colosseum is in the country of'. We find that the mechanistic story behind factual recall is more complex than previously thought. It comprises several distinct, independent, and qualitatively different mechanisms that additively combine, constructively interfering on the correct attribute. We term this generic phenomena the additive motif: models compute through summing up multiple independent contributions. Each mechanism's contribution may be insufficient alone, but summing results in constructive interfere on the correct answer. In addition, we extend the method of direct logit attribution to attribute an attention head's output to individual source tokens. We use this technique to unpack what we call `mixed heads' -- which are themselves a pair of two separate additive updates from different source tokens.