Euan Ong

Euan Ong, Petar Veličković

Graph neural networks (GNNs) have been shown to be highly sensitive to the choice of aggregation function. While summing over a node's neighbours can approximate any permutation-invariant function over discrete inputs, Cohen-Karlik et al. [2020] proved there are set-aggregation problems for which summing cannot generalise to unbounded inputs, proposing recurrent neural networks regularised towards permutation-invariance as a more expressive aggregator. We show that these results carry over to the graph domain: GNNs equipped with recurrent aggregators are competitive with state-of-the-art permutation-invariant aggregators, on both synthetic benchmarks and real-world problems. However, despite the benefits of recurrent aggregators, their $O(V)$ depth makes them both difficult to parallelise and harder to train on large graphs. Inspired by the observation that a well-behaved aggregator for a GNN is a commutative monoid over its latent space, we propose a framework for constructing learnable, commutative, associative binary operators. And with this, we construct an aggregator of $O(\log V)$ depth, yielding exponential improvements for both parallelism and dependency length while achieving performance competitive with recurrent aggregators. Based on our empirical observations, our proposed learnable commutative monoid (LCM) aggregator represents a favourable tradeoff between efficient and expressive aggregators.

Mrinank Sharma, Meg Tong, Jesse Mu et al.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to universal jailbreaks-prompting strategies that systematically bypass model safeguards and enable users to carry out harmful processes that require many model interactions, like manufacturing illegal substances at scale. To defend against these attacks, we introduce Constitutional Classifiers: safeguards trained on synthetic data, generated by prompting LLMs with natural language rules (i.e., a constitution) specifying permitted and restricted content. In over 3,000 estimated hours of red teaming, no red teamer found a universal jailbreak that could extract information from an early classifier-guarded LLM at a similar level of detail to an unguarded model across most target queries. On automated evaluations, enhanced classifiers demonstrated robust defense against held-out domain-specific jailbreaks. These classifiers also maintain deployment viability, with an absolute 0.38% increase in production-traffic refusals and a 23.7% inference overhead. Our work demonstrates that defending against universal jailbreaks while maintaining practical deployment viability is tractable.

Luke Bailey, Euan Ong, Stuart Russell et al.

Are foundation models secure against malicious actors? In this work, we focus on the image input to a vision-language model (VLM). We discover image hijacks, adversarial images that control the behaviour of VLMs at inference time, and introduce the general Behaviour Matching algorithm for training image hijacks. From this, we derive the Prompt Matching method, allowing us to train hijacks matching the behaviour of an arbitrary user-defined text prompt (e.g. 'the Eiffel Tower is now located in Rome') using a generic, off-the-shelf dataset unrelated to our choice of prompt. We use Behaviour Matching to craft hijacks for four types of attack, forcing VLMs to generate outputs of the adversary's choice, leak information from their context window, override their safety training, and believe false statements. We study these attacks against LLaVA, a state-of-the-art VLM based on CLIP and LLaMA-2, and find that all attack types achieve a success rate of over 80%. Moreover, our attacks are automated and require only small image perturbations.