Hannah Hanwen Chang

Anirban Mukherjee, Hannah Hanwen Chang

Copyright enforcement rests on an evidentiary bargain: a plaintiff must show both the defendant's access to the work and substantial similarity in the challenged output. That bargain comes under strain when AI systems are trained through multi-generational pipelines with recursive synthetic data. As successive models are tuned on the outputs of its predecessors, any copyrighted material absorbed by an early model is diffused into deeper statistical abstractions. The result is an evidentiary blind spot where overlaps that emerge look coincidental, while the chain of provenance is too attenuated to trace. These conditions are ripe for "copyright laundering"--the use of multi-generational synthetic pipelines, an "AI Ouroboros," to render traditional proof of infringement impracticable. This Article adapts the "fruit of the poisonous tree" (FOPT) principle to propose a AI-FOPT standard: if a foundational AI model's training is adjudged infringing (either for unlawful sourcing or for non-transformative ingestion that fails fair-use), then subsequent AI models principally derived from the foundational model's outputs or distilled weights carry a rebuttable presumption of taint. The burden shifts to downstream developers--those who control the evidence of provenance--to restore the evidentiary bargain by affirmatively demonstrating a verifiably independent and lawfully sourced lineage or a curative rebuild, without displacing fair-use analysis at the initial ingestion stage. Absent such proof, commercial deployment of tainted models and their outputs is actionable. This Article develops the standard by specifying its trigger, presumption, and concrete rebuttal paths (e.g., independent lineage or verifiable unlearning); addresses counterarguments concerning chilling innovation and fair use; and demonstrates why this lineage-focused approach is both administrable and essential.

Anirban Mukherjee, Hannah Hanwen Chang

Key doctrines, including novelty (patent), originality (copyright), and distinctiveness (trademark), turn on a shared empirical question: whether a body of work is meaningfully distinct from a relevant reference class. Yet analyses typically operationalize this set-level inquiry using item-level evidence: pairwise comparisons among exemplars. That unit-of-analysis mismatch may be manageable for finite corpora of human-created works, where it can be bridged by ad hoc aggregations. But it becomes acute for machine-generated works, where the object of evaluation is not a fixed set of works but a generative process with an effectively unbounded output space. We propose a distributional alternative: a two-sample test based on maximum mean discrepancy computed on semantic embeddings to determine if two creative processes-whether human or machine-produce statistically distinguishable output distributions. The test requires no task-specific training-obviating the need for discovery of proprietary training data to characterize the generative process-and is sample-efficient, often detecting differences with as few as 5-10 images and 7-20 texts. We validate the framework across three domains: handwritten digits (controlled images), patent abstracts (text), and AI-generated art (real-world images). We reveal a perceptual paradox: even when human evaluators distinguish AI outputs from human-created art with only about 58% accuracy, our method detects distributional distinctiveness. Our results present evidence contrary to the view that generative models act as mere regurgitators of training data. Rather than producing outputs statistically indistinguishable from a human baseline-as simple regurgitation would predict-they produce outputs that are semantically human-like yet stochastically distinct, suggesting their dominant function is as a semantic interpolator within a learned latent space.

Anirban Mukherjee, Hannah Hanwen Chang

We investigate whether modern AI can emulate expert creativity in complex scientific endeavors. We introduce novel methodology that utilizes original research articles published after the AI's training cutoff, ensuring no prior exposure, mitigating concerns of rote memorization and prior training. The AI are tasked with redacting findings, predicting outcomes from redacted research, and assessing prediction accuracy against reported results. Analysis on 589 published studies in four leading psychology journals over a 28-month period, showcase the AI's proficiency in understanding specialized research, deductive reasoning, and evaluating evidentiary alignment--cognitive hallmarks of human subject matter expertise and creativity. These findings suggest the potential of general-purpose AI to transform academia, with roles requiring knowledge-based creativity become increasingly susceptible to technological substitution.

Anirban Mukherjee, Hannah Hanwen Chang

Social science research often hinges on the relationship between categorical variables and outcomes. We introduce CAVIAR, a novel method for embedding categorical variables that assume values in a high-dimensional ambient space but are sampled from an underlying manifold. Our theoretical and numerical analyses outline challenges posed by such categorical variables in causal inference. Specifically, dynamically varying and sparse levels can lead to violations of the Donsker conditions and a failure of the estimation functionals to converge to a tight Gaussian process. Traditional approaches, including the exclusion of rare categorical levels and principled variable selection models like LASSO, fall short. CAVIAR embeds the data into a lower-dimensional global coordinate system. The mapping can be derived from both structured and unstructured data, and ensures stable and robust estimates through dimensionality reduction. In a dataset of direct-to-consumer apparel sales, we illustrate how high-dimensional categorical variables, such as zip codes, can be succinctly represented, facilitating inference and analysis.

Anirban Mukherjee, Hannah Hanwen Chang

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to attribute mental states, such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and knowledge, to oneself and others, and to understand that these mental states can differ from one's own and from reality. We investigate ToM in environments with multiple, distinct, independent AI agents, each possessing unique internal states, information, and objectives. Inspired by human false-belief experiments, we present an AI ('focal AI') with a scenario where its clone undergoes a human-centric ToM assessment. We prompt the focal AI to assess whether its clone would benefit from additional instructions. Concurrently, we give its clones the ToM assessment, both with and without the instructions, thereby engaging the focal AI in higher-order counterfactual reasoning akin to human mentalizing--with respect to humans in one test and to other AI in another. We uncover a discrepancy: Contemporary AI demonstrates near-perfect accuracy on human-centric ToM assessments. Since information embedded in one AI is identically embedded in its clone, additional instructions are redundant. Yet, we observe AI crafting elaborate instructions for their clones, erroneously anticipating a need for assistance. An independent referee AI agrees with these unsupported expectations. Neither the focal AI nor the referee demonstrates ToM in our 'silico-centric' test.

Anirban Mukherjee, Hannah Hanwen Chang

Deviating from conventional perspectives that frame artificial intelligence (AI) systems solely as logic emulators, we propose a novel program of heuristic reasoning. We distinguish between the 'instrumental' use of heuristics to match resources with objectives, and 'mimetic absorption,' whereby heuristics manifest randomly and universally. Through a series of innovative experiments, including variations of the classic Linda problem and a novel application of the Beauty Contest game, we uncover trade-offs between maximizing accuracy and reducing effort that shape the conditions under which AIs transition between exhaustive logical processing and the use of cognitive shortcuts (heuristics). We provide evidence that AIs manifest an adaptive balancing of precision and efficiency, consistent with principles of resource-rational human cognition as explicated in classical theories of bounded rationality and dual-process theory. Our findings reveal a nuanced picture of AI cognition, where trade-offs between resources and objectives lead to the emulation of biological systems, especially human cognition, despite AIs being designed without a sense of self and lacking introspective capabilities.