Wei Wang

Wen Cheng, Ke Sun, Xinyu Zhang et al.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has significantly advanced code completion capabilities, giving rise to a new generation of LLM-based Code Completion Tools (LCCTs). Unlike general-purpose LLMs, these tools possess unique workflows, integrating multiple information sources as input and prioritizing code suggestions over natural language interaction, which introduces distinct security challenges. Additionally, LCCTs often rely on proprietary code datasets for training, raising concerns about the potential exposure of sensitive data. This paper exploits these distinct characteristics of LCCTs to develop targeted attack methodologies on two critical security risks: jailbreaking and training data extraction attacks. Our experimental results expose significant vulnerabilities within LCCTs, including a 99.4% success rate in jailbreaking attacks on GitHub Copilot and a 46.3% success rate on Amazon Q. Furthermore, We successfully extracted sensitive user data from GitHub Copilot, including 54 real email addresses and 314 physical addresses associated with GitHub usernames. Our study also demonstrates that these code-based attack methods are effective against general-purpose LLMs, such as the GPT series, highlighting a broader security misalignment in the handling of code by modern LLMs. These findings underscore critical security challenges associated with LCCTs and suggest essential directions for strengthening their security frameworks. The example code and attack samples from our research are provided at https://github.com/Sensente/Security-Attacks-on-LCCTs.

Xiaoting Lyu, Yufei Han, Wei Wang et al.

Federated Learning (FL) is a collaborative machine learning technique where multiple clients work together with a central server to train a global model without sharing their private data. However, the distribution shift across non-IID datasets of clients poses a challenge to this one-model-fits-all method hindering the ability of the global model to effectively adapt to each client's unique local data. To echo this challenge, personalized FL (PFL) is designed to allow each client to create personalized local models tailored to their private data. While extensive research has scrutinized backdoor risks in FL, it has remained underexplored in PFL applications. In this study, we delve deep into the vulnerabilities of PFL to backdoor attacks. Our analysis showcases a tale of two cities. On the one hand, the personalization process in PFL can dilute the backdoor poisoning effects injected into the personalized local models. Furthermore, PFL systems can also deploy both server-end and client-end defense mechanisms to strengthen the barrier against backdoor attacks. On the other hand, our study shows that PFL fortified with these defense methods may offer a false sense of security. We propose \textit{PFedBA}, a stealthy and effective backdoor attack strategy applicable to PFL systems. \textit{PFedBA} ingeniously aligns the backdoor learning task with the main learning task of PFL by optimizing the trigger generation process. Our comprehensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of \textit{PFedBA} in seamlessly embedding triggers into personalized local models. \textit{PFedBA} yields outstanding attack performance across 10 state-of-the-art PFL algorithms, defeating the existing 6 defense mechanisms. Our study sheds light on the subtle yet potent backdoor threats to PFL systems, urging the community to bolster defenses against emerging backdoor challenges.

Wei Wang, Guozhu Meng, Haoyu Wang et al.

Authorship identification is the process of identifying and classifying authors through given codes. Authorship identification can be used in a wide range of software domains, e.g., code authorship disputes, plagiarism detection, exposure of attackers' identity. Besides the inherent challenges from legacy software development, framework programming and crowdsourcing mode in Android raise the difficulties of authorship identification significantly. More specifically, widespread third party libraries and inherited components (e.g., classes, methods, and variables) dilute the primary code within the entire Android app and blur the boundaries of code written by different authors. However, prior research has not well addressed these challenges. To this end, we design a two-phased approach to attribute the primary code of an Android app to the specific developer. In the first phase, we put forward three types of strategies to identify the relationships between Java packages in an app, which consist of context, semantic and structural relationships. A package aggregation algorithm is developed to cluster all packages that are of high probability written by the same authors. In the second phase, we develop three types of features to capture authors' coding habits and code stylometry. Based on that, we generate fingerprints for an author from its developed Android apps and employ several machine learning algorithms for authorship classification. We evaluate our approach in three datasets that contain 15,666 apps from 257 distinct developers and achieve a 92.5% accuracy rate on average. Additionally, we test it on 2,900 obfuscated apps and our approach can classify apps with an accuracy rate of 80.4%.