Yongjin Yang

Yongjin Yang, Haneul Yoo, Hwaran Lee

Despite the massive advancements in large language models (LLMs), they still suffer from producing plausible but incorrect responses. To improve the reliability of LLMs, recent research has focused on uncertainty quantification to predict whether a response is correct or not. However, most uncertainty quantification methods have been evaluated on single-labeled questions, which removes data uncertainty: the irreducible randomness often present in user queries, which can arise from factors like multiple possible answers. This limitation may cause uncertainty quantification results to be unreliable in practical settings. In this paper, we investigate previous uncertainty quantification methods under the presence of data uncertainty. Our contributions are two-fold: 1) proposing a new Multi-Answer Question Answering dataset, MAQA, consisting of world knowledge, mathematical reasoning, and commonsense reasoning tasks to evaluate uncertainty quantification regarding data uncertainty, and 2) assessing 5 uncertainty quantification methods of diverse white- and black-box LLMs. Our findings show that previous methods relatively struggle compared to single-answer settings, though this varies depending on the task. Moreover, we observe that entropy- and consistency-based methods effectively estimate model uncertainty, even in the presence of data uncertainty. We believe these observations will guide future work on uncertainty quantification in more realistic settings.

David Guzman Piedrahita, Yongjin Yang, Mrinmaya Sachan et al.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding their cooperation and social mechanisms is becoming increasingly important. In particular, how LLMs balance self-interest and collective well-being is a critical challenge for ensuring alignment, robustness, and safe deployment. In this paper, we examine the challenge of costly sanctioning in multi-agent LLM systems, where an agent must decide whether to invest its own resources to incentivize cooperation or penalize defection. To study this, we adapt a public goods game with institutional choice from behavioral economics, allowing us to observe how different LLMs navigate social dilemmas over repeated interactions. Our analysis reveals four distinct behavioral patterns among models: some consistently establish and sustain high levels of cooperation, others fluctuate between engagement and disengagement, some gradually decline in cooperative behavior over time, and others rigidly follow fixed strategies regardless of outcomes. Surprisingly, we find that reasoning LLMs, such as the o1 series, struggle significantly with cooperation, whereas some traditional LLMs consistently achieve high levels of cooperation. These findings suggest that the current approach to improving LLMs, which focuses on enhancing their reasoning capabilities, does not necessarily lead to cooperation, providing valuable insights for deploying LLM agents in environments that require sustained collaboration. Our code is available at https://github.com/davidguzmanp/SanctSim