Srijoni Majumdar

Srijoni Majumdar, Evangelos Pournaras

The legitimacy of bottom-up democratic processes for the distribution of public funds by policy-makers is challenging and complex. Participatory budgeting is such a process, where voting outcomes may not always be fair or inclusive. Deliberation for which project ideas to put for voting and choose for implementation lack systematization and do not scale. This paper addresses these grand challenges by introducing a novel and legitimate iterative consensus-based participatory budgeting process. Consensus is designed to be a result of decision support via an innovative multi-agent reinforcement learning approach. Voters are assisted to interact with each other to make viable compromises. Extensive experimental evaluation with real-world participatory budgeting data from Poland reveal striking findings: Consensus is reachable, efficient and robust. Compromise is required, which is though comparable to the one of existing voting aggregation methods that promote fairness and inclusion without though attaining consensus.

Evangelos Pournaras, Srijoni Majumdar, Thomas Wellings et al.

Voting methods are instrumental design element of democracies. Citizens use them to express and aggregate their preferences to reach a collective decision. However, voting outcomes can be as sensitive to voting rules as they are to people's voting choices. Despite the significance and inter-disciplinary scientific progress on voting methods, several democracies keep relying on outdated voting methods that do not fit modern, pluralistic societies well, while lacking social innovation. Here, we demonstrate how one can upgrade real-world democracies, namely by using alternative preferential voting methods such as cumulative voting and the method of equal shares designed for a proportional representation of voters' preferences. By rigorously assessing a new participatory budgeting approach applied in the city of Aarau, Switzerland, we unravel the striking voting outcomes of fair voting methods: more winning projects with the same budget and broader geographic and preference representation of citizens by the elected projects, in particular for voters who used to be under-represented, while promoting novel project ideas. We provide profound causal evidence showing that citizens prefer proportional voting methods, which possess strong legitimacy without the need of very technical specialized explanations. We also reveal strong underlying democratic values exhibited by citizens who support fair voting methods such as altruism and compromise. These findings come with a global momentum to unleash a new and long-awaited participation blueprint of how to upgrade democracies.