Christoph P. Neumann

h-index3
2papers

2 Papers

CROct 30, 2023
Security Challenges for Cloud or Fog Computing-Based AI Applications

Amir Pakmehr, Andreas Aßmuth, Christoph P. Neumann et al.

Security challenges for Cloud or Fog-based machine learning services pose several concerns. Securing the underlying Cloud or Fog services is essential, as successful attacks against these services, on which machine learning applications rely, can lead to significant impairments of these applications. Because the requirements for AI applications can also be different, we differentiate according to whether they are used in the Cloud or in a Fog Computing network. This then also results in different threats or attack possibilities. For Cloud platforms, the responsibility for security can be divided between different parties. Security deficiencies at a lower level can have a direct impact on the higher level where user data is stored. While responsibilities are simpler for Fog Computing networks, by moving services to the edge of the network, we have to secure them against physical access to the devices. We conclude by outlining specific information security requirements for AI applications.

CRApr 3, 2024Code
Vocabulary Attack to Hijack Large Language Model Applications

Patrick Levi, Christoph P. Neumann

The fast advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) are driving an increasing number of applications. Together with the growing number of users, we also see an increasing number of attackers who try to outsmart these systems. They want the model to reveal confidential information, specific false information, or offensive behavior. To this end, they manipulate their instructions for the LLM by inserting separators or rephrasing them systematically until they reach their goal. Our approach is different. It inserts words from the model vocabulary. We find these words using an optimization procedure and embeddings from another LLM (attacker LLM). We prove our approach by goal hijacking two popular open-source LLMs from the Llama2 and the Flan-T5 families, respectively. We present two main findings. First, our approach creates inconspicuous instructions and therefore it is hard to detect. For many attack cases, we find that even a single word insertion is sufficient. Second, we demonstrate that we can conduct our attack using a different model than the target model to conduct our attack with.