Z. W. Ge

h-index3
2papers
44citations

2 Papers

24.3CVMay 7, 2025
On Path to Multimodal Generalist: General-Level and General-Bench

Hao Fei, Yuan Zhou, Juncheng Li et al.

The Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) is currently experiencing rapid growth, driven by the advanced capabilities of LLMs. Unlike earlier specialists, existing MLLMs are evolving towards a Multimodal Generalist paradigm. Initially limited to understanding multiple modalities, these models have advanced to not only comprehend but also generate across modalities. Their capabilities have expanded from coarse-grained to fine-grained multimodal understanding and from supporting limited modalities to arbitrary ones. While many benchmarks exist to assess MLLMs, a critical question arises: Can we simply assume that higher performance across tasks indicates a stronger MLLM capability, bringing us closer to human-level AI? We argue that the answer is not as straightforward as it seems. This project introduces General-Level, an evaluation framework that defines 5-scale levels of MLLM performance and generality, offering a methodology to compare MLLMs and gauge the progress of existing systems towards more robust multimodal generalists and, ultimately, towards AGI. At the core of the framework is the concept of Synergy, which measures whether models maintain consistent capabilities across comprehension and generation, and across multiple modalities. To support this evaluation, we present General-Bench, which encompasses a broader spectrum of skills, modalities, formats, and capabilities, including over 700 tasks and 325,800 instances. The evaluation results that involve over 100 existing state-of-the-art MLLMs uncover the capability rankings of generalists, highlighting the challenges in reaching genuine AI. We expect this project to pave the way for future research on next-generation multimodal foundation models, providing a robust infrastructure to accelerate the realization of AGI. Project page: https://generalist.top/

4.1LGMar 17, 2025
Faster Game Solving via Asymmetry of Step Sizes

Linjian Meng, Tianpei Yang, Youzhi Zhang et al.

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithms are widely used to compute a Nash equilibrium (NE) in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information extensive-form games (IIGs). Among them, Predictive CFR$^+$ (PCFR$^+$) is particularly powerful, achieving an exceptionally fast empirical convergence rate via the prediction in many games.However, the empirical convergence rate of PCFR$^+$ would significantly degrade if the prediction is inaccurate, leading to unstable performance on certain IIGs. To enhance the robustness of PCFR$^+$, we propose Asymmetric PCFR$^+$ (APCFR$^+$), which employs an adaptive asymmetry of step sizes between the updates of implicit and explicit accumulated counterfactual regrets to mitigate the impact of the prediction inaccuracy on convergence. We present a theoretical analysis demonstrating why APCFR$^+$ can enhance the robustness. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose the asymmetry of step sizes, a simple yet novel technique that effectively improves the robustness of PCFR$^+$. Then, to reduce the difficulty of implementing APCFR$^+$ caused by the adaptive asymmetry, we propose a simplified version of APCFR$^+$ called Simple APCFR$^+$ (SAPCFR$^+$), which uses a fixed asymmetry of step sizes to enable only a single-line modification compared to original PCFR$^+$.Experimental results on five standard IIG benchmarks and two heads-up no-limit Texas Hold' em (HUNL) Subagems show that (i) both APCFR$^+$ and SAPCFR$^+$ outperform PCFR$^+$ in most of the tested games, (ii) SAPCFR$^+$ achieves a comparable empirical convergence rate with APCFR$^+$,and (iii) our approach can be generalized to improve other CFR algorithms, e.g., Discount CFR (DCFR).