Michael T. Smith

Amama Mahmood, Bokyung Kim, Honghao Zhao et al.

Sleep diaries are central to behavioral sleep medicine and cognitive behavioral therapy for insomnia, yet daily completion is difficult to sustain, and static forms often provide limited context for interpreting night-to-night sleep variation. We designed an LLM-powered conversational voice diary that delivers clinically grounded morning and evening sleep diary questions through proactive smart-speaker prompts, structured conversational intake, and adaptive follow-up dialogue. We evaluated the system in a four-week between-subjects field study with 30 university students, comparing it with a text-based mobile diary using matched diary items, reporting windows, and reminder intervals. Compared with the text-based diary, the conversational voice diary showed higher adherence and elicited more detailed contextual self-report about routines, stressors, environmental conditions, and other sleep-related factors. Participants also described the voice diary as easier to integrate into daily routines, despite longer perceived completion time. However, voice-based conversational intake produced lower completeness for some structured diary fields, revealing a trade-off between expressive richness and structured precision. These findings show both the promise and the challenge of using LLM-powered conversational voice assistants for longitudinal health self-report.

Kathrin Grosse, Michael T. Smith, Michael Backes

In machine learning (ML) security, attacks like evasion, model stealing or membership inference are generally studied in individually. Previous work has also shown a relationship between some attacks and decision function curvature of the targeted model. Consequently, we study an ML model allowing direct control over the decision surface curvature: Gaussian Process classifiers (GPCs). For evasion, we find that changing GPC's curvature to be robust against one attack algorithm boils down to enabling a different norm or attack algorithm to succeed. This is backed up by our formal analysis showing that static security guarantees are opposed to learning. Concerning intellectual property, we show formally that lazy learning does not necessarily leak all information when applied. In practice, often a seemingly secure curvature can be found. For example, we are able to secure GPC against empirical membership inference by proper configuration. In this configuration, however, the GPC's hyper-parameters are leaked, e.g. model reverse engineering succeeds. We conclude that attacks on classification should not be studied in isolation, but in relation to each other.