Yiyang Lu

Jingwen Xu, Yiyang Lu, Zisu Huang et al.

Training LLMs for code-related tasks typically depends on high-quality code-documentation pairs, which are costly to curate and often scarce for niche programming languages. We introduce BatCoder, a self-supervised reinforcement learning framework designed to jointly optimize code generation and documentation production. BatCoder employs a back-translation strategy: a documentation is first generated from code, and then the generated documentation is used to reconstruct the original code. The semantic similarity between the original and reconstructed code serves as an implicit reward, enabling reinforcement learning to improve the model's performance both in generating code from documentation and vice versa. This approach allows models to be trained using only code, substantially increasing the available training examples. Evaluated on HumanEval and MBPP with a 7B model, BatCoder achieved 83.5% and 81.0% pass@1, outperforming strong open-source baselines. Moreover, the framework demonstrates consistent scaling with respect to both training corpus size and model capacity.

Yiyang Lu, Jinwen He, Yue Zhao et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely integrated into interactive systems such as dialogue agents and task-oriented assistants. This growing ecosystem also raises supply-chain risks, where adversaries can distribute poisoned models that degrade downstream reliability and user trust. Existing backdoor attacks and defenses are largely prompt-centric, focusing on user-visible triggers while overlooking structural signals in multi-turn conversations. We propose Turn-based Structural Trigger (TST), a backdoor attack that activates from dialogue structure, using the turn index as the trigger and remaining independent of user inputs. Across four widely used open-source LLM models, TST achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 99.52% with minimal utility degradation, and remains effective under five representative defenses with an average ASR of 98.04%. The attack also generalizes well across instruction datasets, maintaining an average ASR of 99.19%. Our results suggest that dialogue structure constitutes an important and under-studied attack surface for multi-turn LLM systems, motivating structure-aware auditing and mitigation in practice.