Christopher H. Onder

h-index35
2papers
6,101citations

2 Papers

2.2SYJul 13
Game Theory in Formula 1: From Physical to Strategic Interactions

Giona Fieni, Marc-Philippe Neumann, Francesca Furia et al.

This paper presents an optimization framework to model multi-agent racing dynamics. By incorporating physically accurate interaction models and accounting for the optimal responses of competing agents, our approach reveals strategic behaviors typical of motorsport. Aerodynamic wake effects, trajectory optimization, and energy management are captured and evaluated on a representative case study, based on a Formula 1 scenario. We describe the minimum lap time problem with two agents as either a Nash or a Stackelberg game, and by employing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions during the problem formulation, we recover the structure of a nonlinear program. In addition, we introduce an algorithm to refine local Stackelberg solutions, using the Nash costs as upper bounds. The resulting strategies are analyzed through case studies. We examine the impact of slipstreaming on trajectory selection in corners, straights, and high-speed sections, while also identifying optimal overtaking locations based on energy allocation strategies. Exploiting the structural similarities of the game formulations, we are able to compare symmetric and hierarchical strategies to analyze competitive racing dynamics. The proposed methodology closes the gap between theoretical game theory and practical applications, with relevance in multi-agent systems with coupled nonlinear dynamics.

19.1SYApr 30, 2018
On the Interaction between Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand and Public Transportation Systems

Mauro Salazar, Federico Rossi, Maximilian Schiffer et al.

In this paper we study models and coordination policies for intermodal Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand (AMoD), wherein a fleet of self-driving vehicles provides on-demand mobility jointly with public transit. Specifically, we first present a network flow model for intermodal AMoD, where we capture the coupling between AMoD and public transit and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Second, leveraging such a model, we design a pricing and tolling scheme that allows to achieve the social optimum under the assumption of a perfect market with selfish agents. Finally, we present a real-world case study for New York City. Our results show that the coordination between AMoD fleets and public transit can yield significant benefits compared to an AMoD system operating in isolation.