Sebastian Ernst

AI
h-index11
3papers
11citations
Novelty42%
AI Score23

3 Papers

AIMar 27, 2023
Towards secure judgments aggregation in AHP

Konrad Kułakowski, Jacek Szybowski, Jiri Mazurek et al.

In decision-making methods, it is common to assume that the experts are honest and professional. However, this is not the case when one or more experts in the group decision making framework, such as the group analytic hierarchy process (GAHP), try to manipulate results in their favor. The aim of this paper is to introduce two heuristics in the GAHP, setting allowing to detect the manipulators and minimize their effect on the group consensus by diminishing their weights. The first heuristic is based on the assumption that manipulators will provide judgments which can be considered outliers with respect to those of the rest of the experts in the group. The second heuristic assumes that dishonest judgments are less consistent than the average consistency of the group. Both approaches are illustrated with numerical examples and simulations.

AIApr 6, 2023
Almost optimal manipulation of a pair of alternatives

Jacek Szybowski, Konrad Kułakowski, Sebastian Ernst

The role of an expert in the decision-making process is crucial, as the final recommendation depends on his disposition, clarity of mind, experience, and knowledge of the problem. However, the recommendation also depends on their honesty. But what if the expert is dishonest? Then, the answer on how difficult it is to manipulate in a given case becomes essential. In the presented work, we consider manipulation of a ranking obtained by comparing alternatives in pairs. More specifically, we propose an algorithm for finding an almost optimal way to swap the positions of two selected alternatives. Thanks to this, it is possible to determine how difficult such manipulation is in a given case. Theoretical considerations are illustrated by a practical example.

AIMar 21, 2024
Establishing a leader in a pairwise comparisons method

Jacek Szybowski, Konrad Kułakowski, Jiri Mazurek et al.

Abstract Like electoral systems, decision-making methods are also vulnerable to manipulation by decision-makers. The ability to effectively defend against such threats can only come from thoroughly understanding the manipulation mechanisms. In the presented article, we show two algorithms that can be used to launch a manipulation attack. They allow for equating the weights of two selected alternatives in the pairwise comparison method and, consequently, choosing a leader. The theoretical considerations are accompanied by a Monte Carlo simulation showing the relationship between the size of the PC matrix, the degree of inconsistency, and the ease of manipulation. This work is a continuation of our previous research published in the paper (Szybowski et al., 2023)