Ruchira Ray

Teresa Yeo, Andrei Atanov, Harold Benoit et al.

We present a method to control a text-to-image generative model to produce training data useful for supervised learning. Unlike previous works that employ an open-loop approach and pre-define prompts to generate new data using either a language model or human expertise, we develop an automated closed-loop system which involves two feedback mechanisms. The first mechanism uses feedback from a given supervised model and finds adversarial prompts that result in image generations that maximize the model loss. While these adversarial prompts result in diverse data informed by the model, they are not informed of the target distribution, which can be inefficient. Therefore, we introduce the second feedback mechanism that guides the generation process towards a certain target distribution. We call the method combining these two mechanisms Guided Adversarial Prompts. We perform our evaluations on different tasks, datasets and architectures, with different types of distribution shifts (spuriously correlated data, unseen domains) and demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed feedback mechanisms compared to open-loop approaches.

Ruchira Ray, Ruchi Bhalani

As the popularity of Large Language Models (LLMs) grow, combining model safety with utility becomes increasingly important. The challenge is making sure that LLMs can recognize and decline dangerous prompts without sacrificing their ability to be helpful. The problem of "exaggerated safety" demonstrates how difficult this can be. To reduce excessive safety behaviours -- which was discovered to be 26.1% of safe prompts being misclassified as dangerous and refused -- we use a combination of XSTest dataset prompts as well as interactive, contextual, and few-shot prompting to examine the decision bounds of LLMs such as Llama2, Gemma Command R+, and Phi-3. We find that few-shot prompting works best for Llama2, interactive prompting works best Gemma, and contextual prompting works best for Command R+ and Phi-3. Using a combination of these prompting strategies, we are able to mitigate exaggerated safety behaviors by an overall 92.9% across all LLMs. Our work presents a multiple prompting strategies to jailbreak LLMs' decision-making processes, allowing them to navigate the tight line between refusing unsafe prompts and remaining helpful.