Stuart Armstrong

AI
h-index16
6papers
45citations
Novelty37%
AI Score33

6 Papers

13.9AIMar 20, 2022
Recognising the importance of preference change: A call for a coordinated multidisciplinary research effort in the age of AI

Matija Franklin, Hal Ashton, Rebecca Gorman et al.

As artificial intelligence becomes more powerful and a ubiquitous presence in daily life, it is imperative to understand and manage the impact of AI systems on our lives and decisions. Modern ML systems often change user behavior (e.g. personalized recommender systems learn user preferences to deliver recommendations that change online behavior). An externality of behavior change is preference change. This article argues for the establishment of a multidisciplinary endeavor focused on understanding how AI systems change preference: Preference Science. We operationalize preference to incorporate concepts from various disciplines, outlining the importance of meta-preferences and preference-change preferences, and proposing a preliminary framework for how preferences change. We draw a distinction between preference change, permissible preference change, and outright preference manipulation. A diversity of disciplines contribute unique insights to this framework.

3.9AIJun 19, 2023
Concept Extrapolation: A Conceptual Primer

Matija Franklin, Rebecca Gorman, Hal Ashton et al.

This article is a primer on concept extrapolation - the ability to take a concept, a feature, or a goal that is defined in one context and extrapolate it safely to a more general context. Concept extrapolation aims to solve model splintering - a ubiquitous occurrence wherein the features or concepts shift as the world changes over time. Through discussing value splintering and value extrapolation the article argues that concept extrapolation is necessary for Artificial Intelligence alignment.

3.9AISep 28, 2023
CoinRun: Solving Goal Misgeneralisation

Stuart Armstrong, Alexandre Maranhão, Oliver Daniels-Koch et al.

Goal misgeneralisation is a key challenge in AI alignment -- the task of getting powerful Artificial Intelligences to align their goals with human intentions and human morality. In this paper, we show how the ACE (Algorithm for Concept Extrapolation) agent can solve one of the key standard challenges in goal misgeneralisation: the CoinRun challenge. It uses no new reward information in the new environment. This points to how autonomous agents could be trusted to act in human interests, even in novel and critical situations.

16.7CRFeb 1, 2025Code
Defense Against the Dark Prompts: Mitigating Best-of-N Jailbreaking with Prompt Evaluation

Stuart Armstrong, Matija Franklin, Connor Stevens et al.

Recent work showed Best-of-N (BoN) jailbreaking using repeated use of random augmentations (such as capitalization, punctuation, etc) is effective against all major large language models (LLMs). We have found that $100\%$ of the BoN paper's successful jailbreaks (confidence interval $[99.65\%, 100.00\%]$) and $99.8\%$ of successful jailbreaks in our replication (confidence interval $[99.28\%, 99.98\%]$) were blocked with our Defense Against The Dark Prompts (DATDP) method. The DATDP algorithm works by repeatedly utilizing an evaluation LLM to evaluate a prompt for dangerous or manipulative behaviors--unlike some other approaches, DATDP also explicitly looks for jailbreaking attempts--until a robust safety rating is generated. This success persisted even when utilizing smaller LLMs to power the evaluation (Claude and LLaMa-3-8B-instruct proved almost equally capable). These results show that, though language models are sensitive to seemingly innocuous changes to inputs, they seem also capable of successfully evaluating the dangers of these inputs. Versions of DATDP can therefore be added cheaply to generative AI systems to produce an immediate significant increase in safety.

3.3AIAug 21, 2025
AI Chaperones Are (Really) All You Need to Prevent Parasocial Relationships with Chatbots

Emma Rath, Stuart Armstrong, Rebecca Gorman

Emerging reports of the harms caused to children and adults by AI sycophancy and by parasocial ties with chatbots point to an urgent need for safeguards against such risks. Yet, preventing such dynamics is challenging: parasocial cues often emerge gradually in private conversations between chatbots and users, and we lack effective methods to mitigate these risks. We address this challenge by introducing a simple response evaluation framework (an AI chaperone agent) created by repurposing a state-of-the-art language model to evaluate ongoing conversations for parasocial cues. We constructed a small synthetic dataset of thirty dialogues spanning parasocial, sycophantic, and neutral conversations. Iterative evaluation with five-stage testing successfully identified all parasocial conversations while avoiding false positives under a unanimity rule, with detection typically occurring within the first few exchanges. These findings provide preliminary evidence that AI chaperones can be a viable solution for reducing the risk of parasocial relationships.

6.2AIFeb 28, 2022
The dangers in algorithms learning humans' values and irrationalities

Rebecca Gorman, Stuart Armstrong

For an artificial intelligence (AI) to be aligned with human values (or human preferences), it must first learn those values. AI systems that are trained on human behavior, risk miscategorising human irrationalities as human values -- and then optimising for these irrationalities. Simply learning human values still carries risks: AI learning them will inevitably also gain information on human irrationalities and human behaviour/policy. Both of these can be dangerous: knowing human policy allows an AI to become generically more powerful (whether it is partially aligned or not aligned at all), while learning human irrationalities allows it to exploit humans without needing to provide value in return. This paper analyses the danger in developing artificial intelligence that learns about human irrationalities and human policy, and constructs a model recommendation system with various levels of information about human biases, human policy, and human values. It concludes that, whatever the power and knowledge of the AI, it is more dangerous for it to know human irrationalities than human values. Thus it is better for the AI to learn human values directly, rather than learning human biases and then deducing values from behaviour.