Tao Lin

Yuxuan Sun, Hao Wu, Chenglu Zhu et al.

The emergence of large multimodal models has unlocked remarkable potential in AI, particularly in pathology. However, the lack of specialized, high-quality benchmark impeded their development and precise evaluation. To address this, we introduce PathMMU, the largest and highest-quality expert-validated pathology benchmark for Large Multimodal Models (LMMs). It comprises 33,428 multimodal multi-choice questions and 24,067 images from various sources, each accompanied by an explanation for the correct answer. The construction of PathMMU harnesses GPT-4V's advanced capabilities, utilizing over 30,000 image-caption pairs to enrich captions and generate corresponding Q&As in a cascading process. Significantly, to maximize PathMMU's authority, we invite seven pathologists to scrutinize each question under strict standards in PathMMU's validation and test sets, while simultaneously setting an expert-level performance benchmark for PathMMU. We conduct extensive evaluations, including zero-shot assessments of 14 open-sourced and 4 closed-sourced LMMs and their robustness to image corruption. We also fine-tune representative LMMs to assess their adaptability to PathMMU. The empirical findings indicate that advanced LMMs struggle with the challenging PathMMU benchmark, with the top-performing LMM, GPT-4V, achieving only a 49.8% zero-shot performance, significantly lower than the 71.8% demonstrated by human pathologists. After fine-tuning, significantly smaller open-sourced LMMs can outperform GPT-4V but still fall short of the expertise shown by pathologists. We hope that the PathMMU will offer valuable insights and foster the development of more specialized, next-generation LMMs for pathology.

Jinwei Yao, Kaiqi Chen, Kexun Zhang et al.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly employed for complex tasks that process multiple generation calls in a tree structure with shared prefixes of tokens, including few-shot prompting, multi-step reasoning, speculative decoding, etc. However, existing inference systems for tree-based applications are inefficient due to improper partitioning of queries and KV cache during attention calculation. This leads to two main issues: (1) a lack of memory access (IO) reuse for KV cache of shared prefixes, and (2) poor load balancing.As a result, there is redundant KV cache IO between GPU global memory and shared memory, along with low GPU utilization. To address these challenges, we propose DeFT(Decoding with Flash Tree-Attention), a hardware-efficient attention algorithm with prefix-aware and load-balanced KV cache partitions. DeFT reduces the number of read/write operations of KV cache during attention calculation through KV-Guided Grouping, a method that avoids repeatedly loading KV cache of shared prefixes in attention computation. Additionally, we propose Flattened Tree KV Splitting, a mechanism that ensures even distribution of the KV cache across partitions with little computation redundancy, enhancing GPU utilization during attention computations. By reducing 73-99% KV cache IO and nearly 100% IO for partial results during attention calculation, DeFT achieves up to 2.23/3.59x speedup in the end-to-end/attention latency across three practical tree-based workloads compared to state-of-the-art attention algorithms. Our code is available at https://github.com/LINs-lab/DeFT.

Xiaotie Deng, Xinyan Hu, Tao Lin et al.

The convergence properties of learning dynamics in repeated auctions is a timely and important question, with numerous applications in, e.g., online advertising markets. This work focuses on repeated first-price auctions where bidders with fixed values learn to bid using mean-based algorithms -- a large class of online learning algorithms that include popular no-regret algorithms such as Multiplicative Weights Update and Follow the Perturbed Leader. We completely characterize the learning dynamics of mean-based algorithms, under two notions of convergence: (1) time-average: the fraction of rounds where bidders play a Nash equilibrium converges to 1; (2) last-iterate: the mixed strategy profile of bidders converges to a Nash equilibrium. Specifically, the results depend on the number of bidders with the highest value: - If the number is at least three, the dynamics almost surely converges to a Nash equilibrium of the auction, in both time-average and last-iterate. - If the number is two, the dynamics almost surely converges to a Nash equilibrium in time-average but not necessarily last-iterate. - If the number is one, the dynamics may not converge to a Nash equilibrium in time-average or last-iterate. Our discovery opens up new possibilities in the study of the convergence of learning dynamics.

Xiaotie Deng, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin et al.

The Empirical Revenue Maximization (ERM) is one of the most important price learning algorithms in auction design: as the literature shows it can learn approximately optimal reserve prices for revenue-maximizing auctioneers in both repeated auctions and uniform-price auctions. However, in these applications the agents who provide inputs to ERM have incentives to manipulate the inputs to lower the outputted price. We generalize the definition of an incentive-awareness measure proposed by Lavi et al (2019), to quantify the reduction of ERM's outputted price due to a change of $m\ge 1$ out of $N$ input samples, and provide specific convergence rates of this measure to zero as $N$ goes to infinity for different types of input distributions. By adopting this measure, we construct an efficient, approximately incentive-compatible, and revenue-optimal learning algorithm using ERM in repeated auctions against non-myopic bidders, and show approximate group incentive-compatibility in uniform-price auctions.

Hu Fu, Tao Lin

In non-truthful auctions, agents' utility for a strategy depends on the strategies of the opponents and also the prior distribution over their private types; the set of Bayes Nash equilibria generally has an intricate dependence on the prior. Using the First Price Auction as our main demonstrating example, we show that $\tilde O(n / ε^2)$ samples from the prior with $n$ agents suffice for an algorithm to learn the interim utilities for all monotone bidding strategies. As a consequence, this number of samples suffice for learning all approximate equilibria. We give almost matching (up to polylog factors) lower bound on the sample complexity for learning utilities. We also consider a setting where agents must pay a search cost to discover their own types. Drawing on a connection between this setting and the first price auction, discovered recently by Kleinberg et al. (2016), we show that $\tilde O(n / ε^2)$ samples suffice for utilities and equilibria to be estimated in a near welfare-optimal descending auction in this setting. En route, we improve the sample complexity bound, recently obtained by Guo et al. (2021), for the Pandora's Box problem, which is a classical model for sequential consumer search.