Yiwei Chen

Ziqiang Zheng, Yiwei Chen, Jipeng Zhang et al.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated a powerful ability to answer various queries as a general-purpose assistant. The continuous multi-modal large language models (MLLM) empower LLMs with the ability to perceive visual signals. The launch of GPT-4 (Generative Pre-trained Transformers) has generated significant interest in the research communities. GPT-4V(ison) has demonstrated significant power in both academia and industry fields, as a focal point in a new artificial intelligence generation. Though significant success was achieved by GPT-4V, exploring MLLMs in domain-specific analysis (e.g., marine analysis) that required domain-specific knowledge and expertise has gained less attention. In this study, we carry out the preliminary and comprehensive case study of utilizing GPT-4V for marine analysis. This report conducts a systematic evaluation of existing GPT-4V, assessing the performance of GPT-4V on marine research and also setting a new standard for future developments in MLLMs. The experimental results of GPT-4V show that the responses generated by GPT-4V are still far away from satisfying the domain-specific requirements of the marine professions. All images and prompts used in this study will be available at https://github.com/hkust-vgd/Marine_GPT-4V_Eval

Bingqi Shang, Yiwei Chen, Yihua Zhang et al.

Large language model (LLM) unlearning has become a critical mechanism for removing undesired data, knowledge, or behaviors from pre-trained models while retaining their general utility. Yet, with the rise of open-weight LLMs, we ask: can the unlearning process itself be backdoored, appearing successful under normal conditions yet reverting to pre-unlearned behavior when a hidden trigger is activated? Drawing inspiration from classical backdoor attacks that embed triggers into training data to enforce specific behaviors, we investigate backdoor unlearning, where models forget as intended in the clean setting but recover forgotten knowledge when the trigger appears. We show that designing such attacks presents unique challenges, hinging on where triggers are placed and how backdoor training is reinforced. We uncover a strong link between backdoor efficacy and the attention sink phenomenon, i.e., shallow input tokens consistently attract disproportionate attention in LLMs. Our analysis reveals that these attention sinks serve as gateways for backdoor unlearning: placing triggers at sink positions and aligning their attention values markedly enhances backdoor persistence. Extensive experiments validate these findings, showing that attention-sink-guided backdoor unlearning reliably restores forgotten knowledge in the presence of backdoor triggers, while behaving indistinguishably from a normally unlearned model when triggers are absent. Code is available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-Backdoor.