Matjaz Perc

Valerio Capraro, Joseph Y. Halpern, Matjaz Perc

We review the literature on models that try to explain human behavior in social interactions described by normal-form games with monetary payoffs. We start by covering social and moral preferences. We then focus on the growing body of research showing that people react to the language in which actions are described, especially when it activates moral concerns. We conclude by arguing that behavioral economics is in the midst of a paradigm shift towards language-based preferences, which will require an exploration of new models and experimental setups.

The Anh Han, Manh Hong Duong, Matjaz Perc

Understanding the emergence of prosocial behaviours among self-interested individuals is an important problem in many scientific disciplines. Various mechanisms have been proposed to explain the evolution of such behaviours, primarily seeking the conditions under which a given mechanism can induce highest levels of cooperation. As these mechanisms usually involve costs that alter individual payoffs, it is however possible that aiming for highest levels of cooperation might be detrimental for social welfare -- the later broadly defined as the total population payoff, taking into account all costs involved for inducing increased prosocial behaviours. Herein, by comparatively analysing the social welfare and cooperation levels obtained from stochastic evolutionary models of two well-established mechanisms of prosocial behaviour, namely, peer and institutional incentives, we demonstrate exactly that. We show that the objectives of maximising cooperation levels and the objectives of maximising social welfare are often misaligned. We argue for the need of adopting social welfare as the main optimisation objective when designing and implementing evolutionary mechanisms for social and collective goods.

Diego D. Lopes, Bruno R. da Cunha, Alvaro F. Martins et al.

Recent research has shown that criminal networks have complex organizational structures, but whether this can be used to predict static and dynamic properties of criminal networks remains little explored. Here, by combining graph representation learning and machine learning methods, we show that structural properties of political corruption, police intelligence, and money laundering networks can be used to recover missing criminal partnerships, distinguish among different types of criminal and legal associations, as well as predict the total amount of money exchanged among criminal agents, all with outstanding accuracy. We also show that our approach can anticipate future criminal associations during the dynamic growth of corruption networks with significant accuracy. Thus, similar to evidence found at crime scenes, we conclude that structural patterns of criminal networks carry crucial information about illegal activities, which allows machine learning methods to predict missing information and even anticipate future criminal behavior.

Leonardo G. J. M. Voltarelli, Natalia Osiecka-Drewniak, Marcin Piwowarczyk et al.

Liquid crystal textures encode rich structural information, yet mapping these images to mesophase identity remains challenging because visually similar patterns can arise from distinct structures. Here we present a simple, interpretable representation that maps textures to a 75-dimensional frequency vector of two-by-two ordinal patterns, grouped into eleven symmetry-based types to characterize a large-scale dataset spanning seven mesophases. Combined with a simple machine learning classifier, this lightweight representation yields near-perfect phase recognition, including the difficult distinction between smectic A and smectic B mesophases. Our approach generalizes to unseen compounds and accurately distinguishes between phase identity and material origin. Unlike deep learning methods, each ordinal pattern is readily interpretable, and model explanations augmented with network visualizations of pattern interactions reveal the specific types and pairwise dependencies that drive each mesophase decision, providing compact, physically meaningful summaries of texture determinants. These results establish two-by-two ordinal patterns as an interpretable and scalable tool for liquid crystal image analysis, with potential applications to other complex patterned systems in materials science.

Valerio Capraro, Roberto Di Paolo, Matjaz Perc et al.

Understanding human behaviour in decision problems and strategic interactions has wide-ranging applications in economics, psychology, and artificial intelligence. Game theory offers a robust foundation for this understanding, based on the idea that individuals aim to maximize a utility function. However, the exact factors influencing strategy choices remain elusive. While traditional models try to explain human behaviour as a function of the outcomes of available actions, recent experimental research reveals that linguistic content significantly impacts decision-making, thus prompting a paradigm shift from outcome-based to language-based utility functions. This shift is more urgent than ever, given the advancement of generative AI, which has the potential to support humans in making critical decisions through language-based interactions. We propose sentiment analysis as a fundamental tool for this shift and take an initial step by analyzing 61 experimental instructions from the dictator game, an economic game capturing the balance between self-interest and the interest of others, which is at the core of many social interactions. Our meta-analysis shows that sentiment analysis can explain human behaviour beyond economic outcomes. We discuss future research directions. We hope this work sets the stage for a novel game theoretical approach that emphasizes the importance of language in human decisions.

Marcos Cardinot, Josephine Griffith, Colm O'Riordan et al.

Research has shown that the addition of abstention as an option transforms social dilemmas to rock-paper-scissor type games, where defectors dominate cooperators, cooperators dominate abstainers (loners), and abstainers (loners), in turn, dominate defectors. In this way, abstention can sustain cooperation even under adverse conditions, although defection also persists due to cyclic dominance. However, to abstain or to act as a loner has, to date, always been considered as an independent, third strategy to complement traditional cooperation and defection. Here we consider probabilistic abstention, where each player is assigned a probability to abstain in a particular instance of the game. In the two limiting cases, the studied game reverts to the prisoner's dilemma game without loners or to the optional prisoner's dilemma game. For intermediate probabilities, we have a new hybrid game, which turns out to be most favorable for the successful evolution of cooperation. We hope this novel hybrid game provides a more realistic view of the dilemma of optional/voluntary participation.