Zishuo Zhao

Zishuo Zhao, Zhixuan Fang, Xuechao Wang et al.

Most concurrent blockchain systems rely heavily on the Proof-of-Work (PoW) or Proof-of-Stake (PoS) mechanisms for decentralized consensus and security assurance. However, the substantial energy expenditure stemming from computationally intensive yet meaningless tasks has raised considerable concerns surrounding traditional PoW approaches, The PoS mechanism, while free of energy consumption, is subject to security and economic issues. Addressing these issues, the paradigm of Proof-of-Useful-Work (PoUW) seeks to employ challenges of practical significance as PoW, thereby imbuing energy consumption with tangible value. While previous efforts in Proof of Learning (PoL) explored the utilization of deep learning model training SGD tasks as PoUW challenges, recent research has revealed its vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks and the theoretical hardness in crafting a byzantine-secure PoL mechanism. In this paper, we introduce the concept of incentive-security that incentivizes rational provers to behave honestly for their best interest, bypassing the existing hardness to design a PoL mechanism with computational efficiency, a provable incentive-security guarantee and controllable difficulty. Particularly, our work is secure against two attacks, and also improves the computational overhead from $Θ(1)$ to $O(\frac{\log E}{E})$. Furthermore, while most recent research assumes trusted problem providers and verifiers, our design also guarantees frontend incentive-security even when problem providers are untrusted, and verifier incentive-security that bypasses the Verifier's Dilemma. By incorporating ML training into blockchain consensus mechanisms with provable guarantees, our research not only proposes an eco-friendly solution to blockchain systems, but also provides a proposal for a completely decentralized computing power market in the new AI age.

Zishuo Zhao, Zhixuan Fang, Xuechao Wang et al.

Most concurrent blockchain systems rely heavily on the Proof-of-Work (PoW) or Proof-of-Stake (PoS) mechanisms for decentralized consensus and security assurance. However, the substantial energy expenditure stemming from computationally intensive yet meaningless tasks has raised considerable concerns surrounding traditional PoW approaches, The PoS mechanism, while free of energy consumption, is subject to security and economic issues. Addressing these issues, the paradigm of Proof-of-Useful-Work (PoUW) seeks to employ challenges of practical significance as PoW, thereby imbuing energy consumption with tangible value. While previous efforts in Proof of Learning (PoL) explored the utilization of deep learning model training SGD tasks as PoUW challenges, recent research has revealed its vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks and the theoretical hardness in crafting a byzantine-secure PoL mechanism. In this paper, we introduce the concept of incentive-security that incentivizes rational provers to behave honestly for their best interest, bypassing the existing hardness to design a PoL mechanism with computational efficiency, a provable incentive-security guarantee and controllable difficulty. Particularly, our work is secure against two attacks, and also improves the computational overhead from $Θ(1)$ to $O(\frac{\log E}{E})$. Furthermore, while most recent research assumes trusted problem providers and verifiers, our design also guarantees frontend incentive-security even when problem providers are untrusted, and verifier incentive-security that bypasses the Verifier's Dilemma. By incorporating ML training into blockchain consensus mechanisms with provable guarantees, our research not only proposes an eco-friendly solution to blockchain systems, but also provides a proposal for a completely decentralized computing power market in the new AI age.

Ke Wang, Zishuo Zhao, Xinyuan Song et al.

Decentralized inference provides a scalable and resilient paradigm for serving large language models (LLMs), enabling distributed resource utilization and reducing reliance on centralized providers. However, in a permissionless environment without trusted nodes, ensuring the correctness of model outputs remains a core challenge. We introduce VeriLLM, a publicly verifiable protocol for decentralized LLM inference that achieves security under a one-honest-verifier assumption while maintaining practical efficiency. VeriLLM combines lightweight empirical rerunning with cryptographic commitments, allowing verifiers to validate results at approximately 1% of the underlying inference cost. To prevent verification bottlenecks, we design an isomorphic inference-verification architecture that multiplexes both inference and verification roles across the same GPU workers. This design (i) improves GPU utilization and overall throughput, (ii) enlarges the effective validator set, enhancing robustness and liveness, and (iii) enforces task indistinguishability to prevent node-specific optimizations or selective behavior. Through theoretical analysis and system-level evaluation, we show that VeriLLM achieves reliable public verifiability with minimal overhead, offering a practical foundation for trustworthy and scalable decentralized LLM inference.