Zana Buçinca

Maurice Jakesch, Zana Buçinca, Saleema Amershi et al. · harvard

Private companies, public sector organizations, and academic groups have outlined ethical values they consider important for responsible artificial intelligence technologies. While their recommendations converge on a set of central values, little is known about the values a more representative public would find important for the AI technologies they interact with and might be affected by. We conducted a survey examining how individuals perceive and prioritize responsible AI values across three groups: a representative sample of the US population (N=743), a sample of crowdworkers (N=755), and a sample of AI practitioners (N=175). Our results empirically confirm a common concern: AI practitioners' value priorities differ from those of the general public. Compared to the US-representative sample, AI practitioners appear to consider responsible AI values as less important and emphasize a different set of values. In contrast, self-identified women and black respondents found responsible AI values more important than other groups. Surprisingly, more liberal-leaning participants, rather than participants reporting experiences with discrimination, were more likely to prioritize fairness than other groups. Our findings highlight the importance of paying attention to who gets to define responsible AI.

Siddharth Swaroop, Zana Buçinca, Krzysztof Z. Gajos et al. · harvard

In settings where users both need high accuracy and are time-pressured, such as doctors working in emergency rooms, we want to provide AI assistance that both increases decision accuracy and reduces decision-making time. Current literature focusses on how users interact with AI assistance when there is no time pressure, finding that different AI assistances have different benefits: some can reduce time taken while increasing overreliance on AI, while others do the opposite. The precise benefit can depend on both the user and task. In time-pressured scenarios, adapting when we show AI assistance is especially important: relying on the AI assistance can save time, and can therefore be beneficial when the AI is likely to be right. We would ideally adapt what AI assistance we show depending on various properties (of the task and of the user) in order to best trade off accuracy and time. We introduce a study where users have to answer a series of logic puzzles. We find that time pressure affects how users use different AI assistances, making some assistances more beneficial than others when compared to no-time-pressure settings. We also find that a user's overreliance rate is a key predictor of their behaviour: overreliers and not-overreliers use different AI assistance types differently. We find marginal correlations between a user's overreliance rate (which is related to the user's trust in AI recommendations) and their personality traits (Big Five Personality traits). Overall, our work suggests that AI assistances have different accuracy-time tradeoffs when people are under time pressure compared to no time pressure, and we explore how we might adapt AI assistances in this setting.

Vivian Lai, Zana Buçinca, Nil-Jana Akpinar et al.

Proactive AI writing assistants need to predict when users want drafting help, yet we lack empirical understanding of what drives preferences. Through a factorial vignette study with 50 participants making 750 pairwise comparisons, we find compositional effort dominates decisions ($ρ= 0.597$) while urgency shows no predictive power ($ρ\approx 0$). More critically, users exhibit a striking perception-behavior gap: they rank urgency first in self-reports despite it being the weakest behavioral driver, representing a complete preference inversion. This misalignment has measurable consequences. Systems designed from users' stated preferences achieve only 57.7\% accuracy, underperforming even naive baselines, while systems using behavioral patterns reach significantly higher 61.3\% ($p < 0.05$). These findings demonstrate that relying on user introspection for system design actively misleads optimization, with direct implications for proactive natural language generation (NLG) systems.

Zana Buçinca, Siddharth Swaroop, Amanda E. Paluch et al. · harvard

Imagine if AI decision-support tools not only complemented our ability to make accurate decisions, but also improved our skills, boosted collaboration, and elevated the joy we derive from our tasks. Despite the potential to optimize a broad spectrum of such human-centric objectives, the design of current AI tools remains focused on decision accuracy alone. We propose offline reinforcement learning (RL) as a general approach for modeling human-AI decision-making to optimize human-AI interaction for diverse objectives. RL can optimize such objectives by tailoring decision support, providing the right type of assistance to the right person at the right time. We instantiated our approach with two objectives: human-AI accuracy on the decision-making task and human learning about the task and learned decision support policies from previous human-AI interaction data. We compared the optimized policies against several baselines in AI-assisted decision-making. Across two experiments (N=316 and N=964), our results demonstrated that people interacting with policies optimized for accuracy achieve significantly better accuracy -- and even human-AI complementarity -- compared to those interacting with any other type of AI support. Our results further indicated that human learning was more difficult to optimize than accuracy, with participants who interacted with learning-optimized policies showing significant learning improvement only at times. Our research (1) demonstrates offline RL to be a promising approach to model human-AI decision-making, leading to policies that may optimize human-centric objectives and provide novel insights about the AI-assisted decision-making space, and (2) emphasizes the importance of considering human-centric objectives beyond decision accuracy in AI-assisted decision-making, opening up the novel research challenge of optimizing human-AI interaction for such objectives.

Tianhao Wang, Zana Buçinca, Zilin Ma

Numerous approaches have been recently proposed for learning fair representations that mitigate unfair outcomes in prediction tasks. A key motivation for these methods is that the representations can be used by third parties with unknown objectives. However, because current fair representations are generally not interpretable, the third party cannot use these fair representations for exploration, or to obtain any additional insights, besides the pre-contracted prediction tasks. Thus, to increase data utility beyond prediction tasks, we argue that the representations need to be fair, yet interpretable. We propose a general framework for learning interpretable fair representations by introducing an interpretable "prior knowledge" during the representation learning process. We implement this idea and conduct experiments with ColorMNIST and Dsprite datasets. The results indicate that in addition to being interpretable, our representations attain slightly higher accuracy and fairer outcomes in a downstream classification task compared to state-of-the-art fair representations.

Zana Buçinca, Maja Barbara Malaya, Krzysztof Z. Gajos

People supported by AI-powered decision support tools frequently overrely on the AI: they accept an AI's suggestion even when that suggestion is wrong. Adding explanations to the AI decisions does not appear to reduce the overreliance and some studies suggest that it might even increase it. Informed by the dual-process theory of cognition, we posit that people rarely engage analytically with each individual AI recommendation and explanation, and instead develop general heuristics about whether and when to follow the AI suggestions. Building on prior research on medical decision-making, we designed three cognitive forcing interventions to compel people to engage more thoughtfully with the AI-generated explanations. We conducted an experiment (N=199), in which we compared our three cognitive forcing designs to two simple explainable AI approaches and to a no-AI baseline. The results demonstrate that cognitive forcing significantly reduced overreliance compared to the simple explainable AI approaches. However, there was a trade-off: people assigned the least favorable subjective ratings to the designs that reduced the overreliance the most. To audit our work for intervention-generated inequalities, we investigated whether our interventions benefited equally people with different levels of Need for Cognition (i.e., motivation to engage in effortful mental activities). Our results show that, on average, cognitive forcing interventions benefited participants higher in Need for Cognition more. Our research suggests that human cognitive motivation moderates the effectiveness of explainable AI solutions.

Zana Buçinca, Phoebe Lin, Krzysztof Z. Gajos et al.

Explainable artificially intelligent (XAI) systems form part of sociotechnical systems, e.g., human+AI teams tasked with making decisions. Yet, current XAI systems are rarely evaluated by measuring the performance of human+AI teams on actual decision-making tasks. We conducted two online experiments and one in-person think-aloud study to evaluate two currently common techniques for evaluating XAI systems: (1) using proxy, artificial tasks such as how well humans predict the AI's decision from the given explanations, and (2) using subjective measures of trust and preference as predictors of actual performance. The results of our experiments demonstrate that evaluations with proxy tasks did not predict the results of the evaluations with the actual decision-making tasks. Further, the subjective measures on evaluations with actual decision-making tasks did not predict the objective performance on those same tasks. Our results suggest that by employing misleading evaluation methods, our field may be inadvertently slowing its progress toward developing human+AI teams that can reliably perform better than humans or AIs alone.