SocialJax: An Evaluation Suite for Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social DilemmasZihao Guo, Shuqing Shi, Richard Willis et al.
Sequential social dilemmas pose a significant challenge in the field of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), requiring environments that accurately reflect the tension between individual and collective interests. Previous benchmarks and environments, such as Melting Pot, provide an evaluation protocol that measures generalization to new social partners in various test scenarios. However, running reinforcement learning algorithms in traditional environments requires substantial computational resources. In this paper, we introduce SocialJax, a suite of sequential social dilemma environments and algorithms implemented in JAX. JAX is a high-performance numerical computing library for Python that enables significant improvements in operational efficiency. Our experiments demonstrate that the SocialJax training pipeline achieves at least 50\texttimes{} speed-up in real-time performance compared to Melting Pot RLlib baselines. Additionally, we validate the effectiveness of baseline algorithms within SocialJax environments. Finally, we use Schelling diagrams to verify the social dilemma properties of these environments, ensuring that they accurately capture the dynamics of social dilemmas.
Learning the Expected Core of Strictly Convex Stochastic Cooperative GamesNam Phuong Tran, The Anh Ta, Shuqing Shi et al.
Reward allocation, also known as the credit assignment problem, has been an important topic in economics, engineering, and machine learning. An important concept in reward allocation is the core, which is the set of stable allocations where no agent has the motivation to deviate from the grand coalition. In previous works, computing the core requires either knowledge of the reward function in deterministic games or the reward distribution in stochastic games. However, this is unrealistic, as the reward function or distribution is often only partially known and may be subject to uncertainty. In this paper, we consider the core learning problem in stochastic cooperative games, where the reward distribution is unknown. Our goal is to learn the expected core, that is, the set of allocations that are stable in expectation, given an oracle that returns a stochastic reward for an enquired coalition each round. Within the class of strictly convex games, we present an algorithm named \texttt{Common-Points-Picking} that returns a point in the expected core given a polynomial number of samples, with high probability. To analyse the algorithm, we develop a new extension of the separation hyperplane theorem for multiple convex sets.
1.8LGFeb 21, 2022
Double Thompson Sampling in Finite stochastic GamesShuqing Shi, Xiaobin Wang, Zhiyou Yang et al.
We consider the trade-off problem between exploration and exploitation under finite discounted Markov Decision Process, where the state transition matrix of the underlying environment stays unknown. We propose a double Thompson sampling reinforcement learning algorithm(DTS) to solve this kind of problem. This algorithm achieves a total regret bound of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(D\sqrt{SAT})$in time horizon $T$ with $S$ states, $A$ actions and diameter $D$. DTS consists of two parts, the first part is the traditional part where we apply the posterior sampling method on transition matrix based on prior distribution. In the second part, we employ a count-based posterior update method to balance between the local optimal action and the long-term optimal action in order to find the global optimal game value. We established a regret bound of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}/S^{2})$. Which is by far the best regret bound for finite discounted Markov Decision Process to our knowledge. Numerical results proves the efficiency and superiority of our approach.