Andrew Du

Andrew Du, Anh-Dzung Doan, Yee Wei Law et al.

The advent of satellite-borne machine learning hardware accelerators has enabled the on-board processing of payload data using machine learning techniques such as convolutional neural networks (CNN). A notable example is using a CNN to detect the presence of clouds in hyperspectral data captured on Earth observation (EO) missions, whereby only clear sky data is downlinked to conserve bandwidth. However, prior to deployment, new missions that employ new sensors will not have enough representative datasets to train a CNN model, while a model trained solely on data from previous missions will underperform when deployed to process the data on the new missions. This underperformance stems from the domain gap, i.e., differences in the underlying distributions of the data generated by the different sensors in previous and future missions. In this paper, we address the domain gap problem in the context of on-board hyperspectral cloud detection. Our main contributions lie in formulating new domain adaptation tasks that are motivated by a concrete EO mission, developing a novel algorithm for bandwidth-efficient supervised domain adaptation, and demonstrating test-time adaptation algorithms on space deployable neural network accelerators. Our contributions enable minimal data transmission to be invoked (e.g., only 1% of the weights in ResNet50) to achieve domain adaptation, thereby allowing more sophisticated CNN models to be deployed and updated on satellites without being hampered by domain gap and bandwidth limitations.

Andrew Du, Bo Chen, Tat-Jun Chin et al.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have become essential for processing the vast amounts of aerial imagery collected using earth-observing satellite platforms. However, DNNs are vulnerable towards adversarial examples, and it is expected that this weakness also plagues DNNs for aerial imagery. In this work, we demonstrate one of the first efforts on physical adversarial attacks on aerial imagery, whereby adversarial patches were optimised, fabricated and installed on or near target objects (cars) to significantly reduce the efficacy of an object detector applied on overhead images. Physical adversarial attacks on aerial images, particularly those captured from satellite platforms, are challenged by atmospheric factors (lighting, weather, seasons) and the distance between the observer and target. To investigate the effects of these challenges, we devised novel experiments and metrics to evaluate the efficacy of physical adversarial attacks against object detectors in aerial scenes. Our results indicate the palpable threat posed by physical adversarial attacks towards DNNs for processing satellite imagery.