Guangyu Shen

Lu Yan, Zhuo Zhang, Guanhong Tao et al.

Backdoor attacks have emerged as a prominent threat to natural language processing (NLP) models, where the presence of specific triggers in the input can lead poisoned models to misclassify these inputs to predetermined target classes. Current detection mechanisms are limited by their inability to address more covert backdoor strategies, such as style-based attacks. In this work, we propose an innovative test-time poisoned sample detection framework that hinges on the interpretability of model predictions, grounded in the semantic meaning of inputs. We contend that triggers (e.g., infrequent words) are not supposed to fundamentally alter the underlying semantic meanings of poisoned samples as they want to stay stealthy. Based on this observation, we hypothesize that while the model's predictions for paraphrased clean samples should remain stable, predictions for poisoned samples should revert to their true labels upon the mutations applied to triggers during the paraphrasing process. We employ ChatGPT, a state-of-the-art large language model, as our paraphraser and formulate the trigger-removal task as a prompt engineering problem. We adopt fuzzing, a technique commonly used for unearthing software vulnerabilities, to discover optimal paraphrase prompts that can effectively eliminate triggers while concurrently maintaining input semantics. Experiments on 4 types of backdoor attacks, including the subtle style backdoors, and 4 distinct datasets demonstrate that our approach surpasses baseline methods, including STRIP, RAP, and ONION, in precision and recall.

Hanxi Guo, Siyuan Cheng, Kaiyuan Zhang et al.

Large language models (LLMs) have become integral to modern software development, producing vast amounts of AI-generated source code. While these models boost programming productivity, their misuse introduces critical risks, including code plagiarism, license violations, and the propagation of insecure programs. As a result, robust detection of AI-generated code is essential. To support the development of such detectors, a comprehensive benchmark that reflects real-world conditions is crucial. However, existing benchmarks fall short -- most cover only a limited set of programming languages and rely on less capable generative models. In this paper, we present CodeMirage, a comprehensive benchmark that addresses these limitations through three major advancements: (1) it spans ten widely used programming languages, (2) includes both original and paraphrased code samples, and (3) incorporates outputs from ten state-of-the-art production-level LLMs, including both reasoning and non-reasoning models from six major providers. Using CodeMirage, we evaluate ten representative detectors across four methodological paradigms under four realistic evaluation configurations, reporting results using three complementary metrics. Our analysis reveals nine key findings that uncover the strengths and weaknesses of current detectors, and identify critical challenges for future work. We believe CodeMirage offers a rigorous and practical testbed to advance the development of robust and generalizable AI-generated code detectors.

Guangyu Shen, Zhihua Li, Xiang Xu et al. · amazon-science

Existing deepfake detection techniques struggle to keep-up with the ever-evolving novel, unseen forgeries methods. This limitation stems from their reliance on statistical artifacts learned during training, which are often tied to specific generation processes that may not be representative of samples from new, unseen deepfake generation methods encountered at test time. We propose that incorporating language guidance can improve deepfake detection generalization by integrating human-like commonsense reasoning -- such as recognizing logical inconsistencies and perceptual anomalies -- alongside statistical cues. To achieve this, we train an expert deepfake vision encoder by combining discriminative classification with image-text contrastive learning, where the text is generated by generalist MLLMs using few-shot prompting. This allows the encoder to extract both language-describable, commonsense deepfake artifacts and statistical forgery artifacts from pixel-level distributions. To further enhance robustness, we integrate data uncertainty learning into vision-language contrastive learning, mitigating noise in image-text supervision. Our expert vision encoder seamlessly interfaces with an LLM, further enabling more generalized and interpretable deepfake detection while also boosting accuracy. The resulting framework, AuthGuard, achieves state-of-the-art deepfake detection accuracy in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution settings, achieving AUC gains of 6.15% on the DFDC dataset and 16.68% on the DF40 dataset. Additionally, AuthGuard significantly enhances deepfake reasoning, improving performance by 24.69% on the DDVQA dataset.

Yingqi Liu, Guangyu Shen, Guanhong Tao et al.

Backdoor attack injects malicious behavior to models such that inputs embedded with triggers are misclassified to a target label desired by the attacker. However, natural features may behave like triggers, causing misclassification once embedded. While they are inevitable, mis-recognizing them as injected triggers causes false warnings in backdoor scanning. A prominent challenge is hence to distinguish natural features and injected backdoors. We develop a novel symmetric feature differencing method that identifies a smallest set of features separating two classes. A backdoor is considered injected if the corresponding trigger consists of features different from the set of features distinguishing the victim and target classes. We evaluate the technique on thousands of models, including both clean and trojaned models, from the TrojAI rounds 2-4 competitions and a number of models on ImageNet. Existing backdoor scanning techniques may produce hundreds of false positives (i.e., clean models recognized as trojaned). Our technique removes 78-100% of the false positives (by a state-of-the-art scanner ABS) with a small increase of false negatives by 0-30%, achieving 17-41% overall accuracy improvement, and facilitates achieving top performance on the leaderboard. It also boosts performance of other scanners. It outperforms false positive removal methods using L2 distance and attribution techniques. We also demonstrate its potential in detecting a number of semantic backdoor attacks.

Guangyu Shen, Yingqi Liu, Guanhong Tao et al.

Back-door attack poses a severe threat to deep learning systems. It injects hidden malicious behaviors to a model such that any input stamped with a special pattern can trigger such behaviors. Detecting back-door is hence of pressing need. Many existing defense techniques use optimization to generate the smallest input pattern that forces the model to misclassify a set of benign inputs injected with the pattern to a target label. However, the complexity is quadratic to the number of class labels such that they can hardly handle models with many classes. Inspired by Multi-Arm Bandit in Reinforcement Learning, we propose a K-Arm optimization method for backdoor detection. By iteratively and stochastically selecting the most promising labels for optimization with the guidance of an objective function, we substantially reduce the complexity, allowing to handle models with many classes. Moreover, by iteratively refining the selection of labels to optimize, it substantially mitigates the uncertainty in choosing the right labels, improving detection accuracy. At the time of submission, the evaluation of our method on over 4000 models in the IARPA TrojAI competition from round 1 to the latest round 4 achieves top performance on the leaderboard. Our technique also supersedes three state-of-the-art techniques in terms of accuracy and the scanning time needed.

Ziyang Tang, Xiang Liu, Guangyu Shen et al.

Aerial imagery has been increasingly adopted in mission-critical tasks, such as traffic surveillance, smart cities, and disaster assistance. However, identifying objects from aerial images faces the following challenges: 1) objects of interests are often too small and too dense relative to the images; 2) objects of interests are often in different relative sizes; and 3) the number of objects in each category is imbalanced. A novel network structure, Points Estimated Network (PENet), is proposed in this work to answer these challenges. PENet uses a Mask Resampling Module (MRM) to augment the imbalanced datasets, a coarse anchor-free detector (CPEN) to effectively predict the center points of the small object clusters, and a fine anchor-free detector FPEN to locate the precise positions of the small objects. An adaptive merge algorithm Non-maximum Merge (NMM) is implemented in CPEN to address the issue of detecting dense small objects, and a hierarchical loss is defined in FPEN to further improve the classification accuracy. Our extensive experiments on aerial datasets visDrone and UAVDT showed that PENet achieved higher precision results than existing state-of-the-art approaches. Our best model achieved 8.7% improvement on visDrone and 20.3% on UAVDT.

Guangyu Shen, Chengzhi Mao, Junfeng Yang et al.

Due to the inherent robustness of segmentation models, traditional norm-bounded attack methods show limited effect on such type of models. In this paper, we focus on generating unrestricted adversarial examples for semantic segmentation models. We demonstrate a simple and effective method to generate unrestricted adversarial examples using conditional generative adversarial networks (CGAN) without any hand-crafted metric. The naïve implementation of CGAN, however, yields inferior image quality and low attack success rate. Instead, we leverage the SPADE (Spatially-adaptive denormalization) structure with an additional loss item to generate effective adversarial attacks in a single step. We validate our approach on the popular Cityscapes and ADE20K datasets, and demonstrate that our synthetic adversarial examples are not only realistic, but also improve the attack success rate by up to 41.0\% compared with the state of the art adversarial attack methods including PGD.