Stephanie Forrest

Jhe-Yu Liou, Stephanie Forrest, Carole-Jean Wu

Parallel accelerators, such as GPUs, are key enablers for large-scale Machine Learning (ML) applications. However, ML model developers often lack detailed knowledge of the underlying system architectures, while system programmers usually do not have a high-level understanding of the ML model that runs on the specific system. To mitigate this gap between two relevant aspects of domain knowledge, this paper proposes GEVO-ML, a tool for automatically discovering optimization opportunities and tuning the performance of ML kernels, where the model and training/prediction processes are uniformly represented in a single intermediate language, the Multiple-Layer Intermediate Representation (MLIR). GEVO-ML uses multi-objective evolutionary search to find edits (mutations) to MLIR code that ultimately runs on GPUs, improving performance on desired criteria while retaining required functionality. We demonstrate GEVO-ML on two different ML workloads for both model training and prediction. GEVO-ML finds significant Pareto improvements for these models, achieving 90.43% performance improvement when model accuracy is relaxed by 2%, from 91.2% to 89.3%. For the training workloads, GEVO-ML finds a 4.88% improvement in model accuracy, from 91% to 96%, without sacrificing training or testing speed. Our analysis of key GEVO-ML mutations reveals diverse code modifications, while might be foreign to human developers, achieving similar effects with how human developers improve model design, for example, by changing learning rates or pruning non-essential layer parameters.

Joseph Renzullo, Pemma Reiter, Westley Weimer et al.

Machine learning (ML) now pervades the field of Automated Program Repair (APR). Algorithms deploy neural machine translation and large language models (LLMs) to generate software patches, among other tasks. But, there are important differences between these applications of ML and earlier work. Evaluations and comparisons must take care to ensure that results are valid and likely to generalize. A challenge is that the most popular APR evaluation benchmarks were not designed with ML techniques in mind. This is especially true for LLMs, whose large and often poorly-disclosed training datasets may include problems on which they are evaluated.

Joshua J. Daymude, Robert Axelrod, Stephanie Forrest

Expressions of dissent against authority are an important feature of most societies, and efforts to suppress such expressions are common. Modern digital communications, social media, and Internet surveillance and censorship technologies are changing the landscape of public speech and dissent. Especially in authoritarian settings, individuals must assess the risk of voicing their true opinions or choose self-censorship, voluntarily moderating their behavior to comply with authority. We present a model in which individuals strategically manage the tradeoff between expressing dissent and avoiding punishment through self-censorship while an authority adapts its policies to minimize both total expressed dissent and punishment costs. We study the model analytically and in simulation to derive conditions separating defiant individuals who express their desired dissent in spite of punishment from self-censoring individuals who fully or partially limit their expression. We find that for any population, there exists an authority policy that leads to total self-censorship. However, the probability and time for an initially moderate, locally-adaptive authority to suppress dissent depend critically on the population's willingness to withstand punishment early on, which can deter the authority from adopting more extreme policies.

Kirtus G. Leyba, Joshua J. Daymude, Jean-Gabriel Young et al.

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is a distributed protocol that manages interdomain routing without requiring a centralized record of which autonomous systems (ASes) connect to which others. Many methods have been devised to infer the AS topology from publicly available BGP data, but none provide a general way to handle the fact that the data are notoriously incomplete and subject to error. This paper describes a method for reliably inferring AS-level connectivity in the presence of measurement error using Bayesian statistical inference acting on BGP routing tables from multiple vantage points. We employ a novel approach for counting AS adjacency observations in the AS-PATH attribute data from public route collectors, along with a Bayesian algorithm to generate a statistical estimate of the AS-level network. Our approach also gives us a way to evaluate the accuracy of existing reconstruction methods and to identify advantageous locations for new route collectors or vantage points.

Mohsen Ahmadi, Kevin Leach, Ryan Dougherty et al.

There is a growing body of malware samples that evade automated analysis and detection tools. Malware may measure fingerprints ("artifacts") of the underlying analysis tool or environment and change their behavior when artifacts are detected. While analysis tools can mitigate artifacts to reduce exposure, such concealment is expensive. However, not every sample checks for every type of artifact-analysis efficiency can be improved by mitigating only those artifacts most likely to be used by a sample. Using that insight, we propose MIMOSA, a system that identifies a small set of "covering" tool configurations that collectively defeat most malware samples with increased efficiency. MIMOSA identifies a set of tool configurations that maximize analysis throughput and detection accuracy while minimizing manual effort, enabling scalable automation to analyze stealthy malware. We evaluate our approach against a benchmark of 1535 labeled stealthy malware samples. Our approach increases analysis throughput over state of the art on over 95% of these samples. We also investigate cost-benefit tradeoffs between the fraction of successfully-analyzed samples and computing resources required. MIMOSA provides a practical, tunable method for efficiently deploying analysis resources.

Jhe-Yu Liou, Xiaodong Wang, Stephanie Forrest et al.

GPUs are a key enabler of the revolution in machine learning and high performance computing, functioning as de facto co-processors to accelerate large-scale computation. As the programming stack and tool support have matured, GPUs have also become accessible to programmers, who may lack detailed knowledge of the underlying architecture and fail to fully leverage the GPU's computation power. GEVO (Gpu optimization using EVOlutionary computation) is a tool for automatically discovering optimization opportunities and tuning the performance of GPU kernels in the LLVM representation. GEVO uses population-based search to find edits to GPU code compiled to LLVM-IR and improves performance on desired criteria while retaining required functionality. We demonstrate that GEVO improves the execution time of the GPU programs in the Rodinia benchmark suite and the machine learning models, SVM and ResNet18, on NVIDIA Tesla P100. For the Rodinia benchmarks, GEVO improves GPU kernel runtime performance by an average of 49.48% and by as much as 412% over the fully compiler-optimized baseline. If kernel output accuracy is relaxed to tolerate up to 1% error, GEVO can find kernel variants that outperform the baseline version by an average of 51.08%. For the machine learning workloads, GEVO achieves kernel performance improvement for SVM on the MNIST handwriting recognition (3.24X) and the a9a income prediction (2.93X) datasets with no loss of model accuracy. GEVO achieves 1.79X kernel performance improvement on image classification using ResNet18/CIFAR-10, with less than 1% model accuracy reduction.

Benjamin Edwards, Jay Jacobs, Stephanie Forrest

Security practices in large organizations are notoriously difficult to assess. The challenge only increases when organizations turn to third parties to provide technology and business services, which typically require tight network integration and sharing of confidential data, potentially increasing the organization's attack surface. The security maturity of an organization describes how well it mitigates known risks and responds to new threats. Today, maturity is typically assessed with audits and questionnaires, which are difficult to quantify, lack objectivity, and may not reflect current threats. This paper demonstrates how external measurement of an organization can be used to assess the relative quality of security among organizations. Using a large dataset from BitSight(www.bitsight.com), a cybersecurity ratings company, containing 3.2 billion measurements spanning nearly 37,000 organizations collected during calendar year 2015, we show how per-organizational "risk vectors" can be constructed that may be related to an organization's overall security posture, or maturity. Using statistical analysis, we then study the correlation between the risk vectors and botnet infections. For example, we find that misconfigured TLS services, publicly available unsecured protocols, and the use of peer-to-peer file sharing correlate with organizations that have increased rates of botnet infections. We argue that the methodology used to identify these correlations can easily be applied to other data to provide a growing picture of organizational security using external measurement.

Eric Schulte, Zachary P. Fry, Ethan Fast et al.

Neutral landscapes and mutational robustness are believed to be important enablers of evolvability in biology. We apply these concepts to software, defining mutational robustness to be the fraction of random mutations that leave a program's behavior unchanged. Test cases are used to measure program behavior and mutation operators are taken from genetic programming. Although software is often viewed as brittle, with small changes leading to catastrophic changes in behavior, our results show surprising robustness in the face of random software mutations. The paper describes empirical studies of the mutational robustness of 22 programs, including 14 production software projects, the Siemens benchmarks, and 4 specially constructed programs. We find that over 30% of random mutations are neutral with respect to their test suite. The results hold across all classes of programs, for mutations at both the source code and assembly instruction levels, across various programming languages, and are only weakly related to test suite coverage. We conclude that mutational robustness is an inherent property of software, and that neutral variants (i.e., those that pass the test suite) often fulfill the program's original purpose or specification. Based on these results, we conjecture that neutral mutations can be leveraged as a mechanism for generating software diversity. We demonstrate this idea by generating a population of neutral program variants and showing that the variants automatically repair unknown bugs with high probability. Neutral landscapes also provide a partial explanation for recent results that use evolutionary computation to automatically repair software bugs.

Steven Hofmeyr, Tyler Moore, Stephanie Forrest et al.

An emerging consensus among policy makers is that interventions undertaken by Internet Service Providers are the best way to counter the rising incidence of malware. However, assessing the suitability of countermeasures at this scale is hard. In this paper, we use an agent-based model, called ASIM, to investigate the impact of policy interventions at the Autonomous System level of the Internet. For instance, we find that coordinated intervention by the 0.2%-biggest ASes is more effective than uncoordinated efforts adopted by 30% of all ASes. Furthermore, countermeasures that block malicious transit traffic appear more effective than ones that block outgoing traffic. The model allows us to quantify and compare positive externalities created by different countermeasures. Our results give an initial indication of the types and levels of intervention that are most cost-effective at large scale.

Benjamin Edwards, Tyler Moore, George Stelle et al.

Malware spread among websites and between websites and clients is an increasing problem. Search engines play an important role in directing users to websites and are a natural control point for intervening, using mechanisms such as blacklisting. The paper presents a simple Markov model of malware spread through large populations of websites and studies the effect of two interventions that might be deployed by a search provider: blacklisting infected web pages by removing them from search results entirely and a generalization of blacklisting, called depreferencing, in which a website's ranking is decreased by a fixed percentage each time period the site remains infected. We analyze and study the trade-offs between infection exposure and traffic loss due to false positives (the cost to a website that is incorrectly blacklisted) for different interventions. As expected, we find that interventions are most effective when websites are slow to remove infections. Surprisingly, we also find that low infection or recovery rates can increase traffic loss due to false positives. Our analysis also shows that heavy-tailed distributions of website popularity, as documented in many studies, leads to high sample variance of all measured outcomes. These result implies that it will be difficult to determine empirically whether certain website interventions are effective, and it suggests that theoretical models such as the one described in this paper have an important role to play in improving web security.