Yuan Deng

Yuan Deng, Amin Karbasi, Vahab Mirrokni et al.

We study procurement auctions, where an auctioneer seeks to acquire services from strategic sellers with private costs. The quality of services is measured by a submodular function known to the auctioneer. Our goal is to design computationally efficient procurement auctions that (approximately) maximize the difference between the quality of the acquired services and the total cost of the sellers, while ensuring incentive compatibility (IC), individual rationality (IR) for sellers, and non-negative surplus (NAS) for the auctioneer. Our contributions are twofold: (i) we provide an improved analysis of existing algorithms for non-positive submodular function maximization, and (ii) we design efficient frameworks that transform submodular optimization algorithms into mechanisms that are IC, IR, NAS, and approximation-preserving. These frameworks apply to both the offline setting, where all sellers' bids and services are available simultaneously, and the online setting, where sellers arrive in an adversarial order, requiring the auctioneer to make irrevocable decisions. We also explore whether state-of-the-art submodular optimization algorithms can be converted into descending auctions in adversarial settings, where the schedule of descending prices is determined by an adversary. We show that a submodular optimization algorithm satisfying bi-criteria $(1/2, 1)$-approximation in welfare can be effectively adapted to a descending auction. Additionally, we establish a connection between descending auctions and online submodular optimization. Finally, we demonstrate the practical applications of our frameworks by instantiating them with state-of-the-art submodular optimization algorithms and empirically comparing their welfare performance on publicly available datasets with thousands of sellers.

Yuan Deng, Jon Schneider, Balusubramanian Sivan

How should a player who repeatedly plays a game against a no-regret learner strategize to maximize his utility? We study this question and show that under some mild assumptions, the player can always guarantee himself a utility of at least what he would get in a Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. When the no-regret learner has only two actions, we show that the player cannot get any higher utility than the Stackelberg equilibrium utility. But when the no-regret learner has more than two actions and plays a mean-based no-regret strategy, we show that the player can get strictly higher than the Stackelberg equilibrium utility. We provide a characterization of the optimal game-play for the player against a mean-based no-regret learner as a solution to a control problem. When the no-regret learner's strategy also guarantees him a no-swap regret, we show that the player cannot get anything higher than a Stackelberg equilibrium utility.

Anima Anandkumar, Yuan Deng, Rong Ge et al.

Developing efficient and guaranteed nonconvex algorithms has been an important challenge in modern machine learning. Algorithms with good empirical performance such as stochastic gradient descent often lack theoretical guarantees. In this paper, we analyze the class of homotopy or continuation methods for global optimization of nonconvex functions. These methods start from an objective function that is efficient to optimize (e.g. convex), and progressively modify it to obtain the required objective, and the solutions are passed along the homotopy path. For the challenging problem of tensor PCA, we prove global convergence of the homotopy method in the "high noise" regime. The signal-to-noise requirement for our algorithm is tight in the sense that it matches the recovery guarantee for the best degree-4 sum-of-squares algorithm. In addition, we prove a phase transition along the homotopy path for tensor PCA. This allows to simplify the homotopy method to a local search algorithm, viz., tensor power iterations, with a specific initialization and a noise injection procedure, while retaining the theoretical guarantees.