Harold Triedman

Shicheng Liu, Sina J. Semnani, Harold Triedman et al. · stanford

Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to significant improvements in the Knowledge Base Question Answering (KBQA) task. However, datasets used in KBQA studies do not capture the true complexity of KBQA tasks. They either have simple questions, use synthetically generated logical forms, or are based on small knowledge base (KB) schemas. We introduce the SPINACH dataset, an expert-annotated KBQA dataset collected from discussions on Wikidata's "Request a Query" forum with 320 decontextualized question-SPARQL pairs. The complexity of these in-the-wild queries calls for a KBQA system that can dynamically explore large and often incomplete schemas and reason about them, as it is infeasible to create a comprehensive training dataset. We also introduce an in-context learning KBQA agent, also called SPINACH, that mimics how a human expert would write SPARQLs to handle challenging questions. SPINACH achieves a new state of the art on the QALD-7, QALD-9 Plus and QALD-10 datasets by 31.0%, 27.0%, and 10.0% in $F_1$, respectively, and coming within 1.6% of the fine-tuned LLaMA SOTA model on WikiWebQuestions. On our new SPINACH dataset, the SPINACH agent outperforms all baselines, including the best GPT-4-based KBQA agent, by at least 38.1% in $F_1$.

Tingwei Zhang, Harold Triedman, Vitaly Shmatikov

Deep-research agents, i.e., systems that rely on multi-agent pipelines to iteratively retrieve, synthesize, and cite Web content in order to produce structured reports, are rapidly replacing traditional search for both routine and complex information needs. These agents issue many related queries during a single research session. We show that for many common search topics, they repeatedly retrieve the same user-generated content (UGC) pages from platforms such as Reddit and Wikipedia. Next, we argue that this retrieval overlap creates a concentrated attack surface: an adversary who appends a short, crafted text to a single, frequently retrieved UGC page can cause the agent to cite attacker-chosen content and promote attacker-chosen entities across many related queries. We evaluate this attack on three representative deep-research systems (STORM, Co-STORM, and OmniThink) across multiple query clusters. We also study defenses at different stages of the pipeline, including source-level filtering and output-based detection. Our findings highlight a fundamental vulnerability in how deep-research agents retrieve and integrate web content.