Thibaud Gloaguen

Thibaud Gloaguen, Robin Staab, Nikola Jovanović et al.

LLM watermarks allow tracing AI-generated texts by inserting a detectable signal into their generated content. Recent works have proposed a wide range of watermarking algorithms, each with distinct designs, usually built using a bottom-up approach. Crucially, there is no general and principled formulation for LLM watermarking. In this work, we show that most existing and widely used watermarking schemes can in fact be derived from a principled constrained optimization problem. Our formulation unifies existing watermarking methods and explicitly reveals the constraints that each method optimizes. In particular, it highlights an understudied quality-diversity-power trade-off. At the same time, our framework also provides a principled approach for designing novel watermarking schemes tailored to specific requirements. For instance, it allows us to directly use perplexity as a proxy for quality, and derive new schemes that are optimal with respect to this constraint. Our experimental evaluation validates our framework: watermarking schemes derived from a given constraint consistently maximize detection power with respect to that constraint.

Thibaud Gloaguen, Nikola Jovanović, Robin Staab et al.

While watermarks for closed LLMs have matured and have been included in large-scale deployments, these methods are not applicable to open-source models, which allow users full control over the decoding process. This setting is understudied yet critical, given the rising performance of open-source models. In this work, we lay the foundation for systematic study of open-source LLM watermarking. For the first time, we explicitly formulate key requirements, including durability against common model modifications such as model merging, quantization, or finetuning, and propose a concrete evaluation setup. Given the prevalence of these modifications, durability is crucial for an open-source watermark to be effective. We survey and evaluate existing methods, showing that they are not durable. We also discuss potential ways to improve their durability and highlight remaining challenges. We hope our work enables future progress on this important problem.

Thibaud Gloaguen, Robin Staab, Mark Vero et al.

With LLM watermarking already being deployed commercially, practical applications increasingly require multibit watermarks that encode more complex payloads, such as user IDs or timestamps, into the generated text. In this work, we propose a fundamentally new approach for multibit watermarking: introducing binomial encoding to directly encode every bit of the payload at every token position. We complement our approach with a stateful encoder that during generation dynamically redirects encoding pressure toward underencoded bits. Our evaluation against 8 baselines on up to 64-bit payloads shows that our scheme achieves superior message accuracy and robustness, with the gap to baseline methods widening in more relevant settings (i.e., large payloads and low-distortion regimes). At the same time, we challenge prior works' evaluation metrics, highlighting their lack of practical insights, and introduce per-bit confidence scoring as a practically relevant metric for evaluating multibit LLM watermarks.

Thibaud Gloaguen, Robin Staab, Nikola Jovanović et al.

Most LLM fingerprinting methods teach the model to respond to a few fixed queries with predefined atypical responses (keys). This memorization often does not survive common deployment steps such as finetuning or quantization, and such keys can be easily detected and filtered from LLM responses, ultimately breaking the fingerprint. To overcome these limitations we introduce LLM fingerprinting via semantically conditioned watermarks, replacing fixed query sets with a broad semantic domain, and replacing brittle atypical keys with a statistical watermarking signal diffused throughout each response. After teaching the model to watermark its responses only to prompts from a predetermined domain e.g., French language, the model owner can use queries from that domain to reliably detect the fingerprint and verify ownership. As we confirm in our thorough experimental evaluation, our fingerprint is both stealthy and robust to all common deployment scenarios.

Thibaud Gloaguen, Robin Staab, Nikola Jovanović et al.

We introduce the first watermark tailored for diffusion language models (DLMs), an emergent LLM paradigm able to generate tokens in arbitrary order, in contrast to standard autoregressive language models (ARLMs) which generate tokens sequentially. While there has been much work in ARLM watermarking, a key challenge when attempting to apply these schemes directly to the DLM setting is that they rely on previously generated tokens, which are not always available with DLM generation. In this work we address this challenge by: (i) applying the watermark in expectation over the context even when some context tokens are yet to be determined, and (ii) promoting tokens which increase the watermark strength when used as context for other tokens. This is accomplished while keeping the watermark detector unchanged. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates that the DLM watermark leads to a >99% true positive rate with minimal quality impact and achieves similar robustness to existing ARLM watermarks, enabling for the first time reliable DLM watermarking.

Kazuki Egashira, Robin Staab, Thibaud Gloaguen et al.

Model pruning, i.e., removing a subset of model weights, has become a prominent approach to reducing the memory footprint of large language models (LLMs) during inference. Notably, popular inference engines, such as vLLM, enable users to conveniently prune downloaded models before they are deployed. While the utility and efficiency of pruning methods have improved significantly, the security implications of pruning remain underexplored. In this work, for the first time, we show that modern LLM pruning methods can be maliciously exploited. In particular, an adversary can construct a model that appears benign yet, once pruned, exhibits malicious behaviors. Our method is based on the idea that the adversary can compute a proxy metric that estimates how likely each parameter is to be pruned. With this information, the adversary can first inject a malicious behavior into those parameters that are unlikely to be pruned. Then, they can repair the model by using parameters that are likely to be pruned, effectively canceling out the injected behavior in the unpruned model. We demonstrate the severity of our attack through extensive evaluation on five models; after any of the pruning in vLLM are applied (Magnitude, Wanda, and SparseGPT), it consistently exhibits strong malicious behaviors in a diverse set of attack scenarios (success rates of up to $95.7\%$ for jailbreak, $98.7\%$ for benign instruction refusal, and $99.5\%$ for targeted content injection). Our results reveal a critical deployment-time security gap and underscore the urgent need for stronger security awareness in model compression.