Subrat Kishore Dutta

CV
h-index11
3papers
2citations
Novelty53%
AI Score36

3 Papers

CVJul 9, 2025
IAP: Invisible Adversarial Patch Attack through Perceptibility-Aware Localization and Perturbation Optimization

Subrat Kishore Dutta, Xiao Zhang

Despite modifying only a small localized input region, adversarial patches can drastically change the prediction of computer vision models. However, prior methods either cannot perform satisfactorily under targeted attack scenarios or fail to produce contextually coherent adversarial patches, causing them to be easily noticeable by human examiners and insufficiently stealthy against automatic patch defenses. In this paper, we introduce IAP, a novel attack framework that generates highly invisible adversarial patches based on perceptibility-aware localization and perturbation optimization schemes. Specifically, IAP first searches for a proper location to place the patch by leveraging classwise localization and sensitivity maps, balancing the susceptibility of patch location to both victim model prediction and human visual system, then employs a perceptibility-regularized adversarial loss and a gradient update rule that prioritizes color constancy for optimizing invisible perturbations. Comprehensive experiments across various image benchmarks and model architectures demonstrate that IAP consistently achieves competitive attack success rates in targeted settings with significantly improved patch invisibility compared to existing baselines. In addition to being highly imperceptible to humans, IAP is shown to be stealthy enough to render several state-of-the-art patch defenses ineffective.

CVDec 5, 2024
Generalizable Targeted Data Poisoning against Varying Physical Objects

Zhizhen Chen, Zhengyu Zhao, Subrat Kishore Dutta et al.

Targeted data poisoning (TDP) aims to compromise the model's prediction on a specific (test) target by perturbing a small subset of training data. Existing work on TDP has focused on an overly ideal threat model in which the same image sample of the target is used during both poisoning and inference stages. However, in the real world, a target object often appears in complex variations due to changes of physical settings such as viewpoint, background, and lighting conditions. In this work, we take the first step toward understanding the real-world threats of TDP by studying its generalizability across varying physical conditions. In particular, we observe that solely optimizing gradient directions, as adopted by the best previous TDP method, achieves limited generalization. To address this limitation, we propose optimizing both the gradient direction and magnitude for more generalizable gradient matching, thereby leading to higher poisoning success rates. For instance, our method outperforms the state of the art by 19.49% when poisoning CIFAR-10 images targeting multi-view cars.

CROct 10, 2025
GREAT: Generalizable Backdoor Attacks in RLHF via Emotion-Aware Trigger Synthesis

Subrat Kishore Dutta, Yuelin Xu, Piyush Pant et al.

Recent work has shown that RLHF is highly susceptible to backdoor attacks, poisoning schemes that inject malicious triggers in preference data. However, existing methods often rely on static, rare-token-based triggers, limiting their effectiveness in realistic scenarios. In this paper, we develop GREAT, a novel framework for crafting generalizable backdoors in RLHF through emotion-aware trigger synthesis. Specifically, GREAT targets harmful response generation for a vulnerable user subgroup characterized by both semantically violent requests and emotionally angry triggers. At the core of GREAT is a trigger identification pipeline that operates in the latent embedding space, leveraging principal component analysis and clustering techniques to identify the most representative triggers. To enable this, we present Erinyes, a high-quality dataset of over $5000$ angry triggers curated from GPT-4.1 using a principled, hierarchical, and diversity-promoting approach. Experiments on benchmark RLHF datasets demonstrate that GREAT significantly outperforms baseline methods in attack success rates, especially for unseen trigger scenarios, while largely preserving the response quality on benign inputs.