Nhi Nguyen

Nhi Nguyen, Shauli Ravfogel, Rajesh Ranganath

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains, where free-text explanations such as chain-of-thought and post-hoc rationales are used to justify model outputs. Yet it remains unclear whether these explanations are sufficient, i.e., if they contain enough information to explain the model's output-generating process. We generalize classical sufficiency from feature attributions to arbitrary explanations and prove that explanation sufficiency can change depending on the input distribution, which must be explicitly defined for LLM explanations. We propose using the LLM itself to generate alternative inputs conditioned on an explanation, capturing its beliefs about possible inputs. We formalize self-consistent sufficiency as a goal for free-text explanations and introduce an information-theoretic metric, SCSuff, that enables evaluation of free-text explanations without relying on predefined biases or shortcuts. Our experiments show that SCSuff agrees with targeted perturbation tests where applicable and demonstrate that explanation sufficiency can vary with the input distribution. We find LLM explanations are generally insufficient and weakly correlated with model size, accuracy, or output entropy. Analysis of final-token hidden states shows that top and bottom SCSuff scores can be predicted from internal representations, suggesting that SCSuff can guide detection and improvement of sufficient LLM explanations. The code for this paper is available at https://github.com/rajesh-lab/self-consistent-sufficiency .

Aahlad Puli, Nhi Nguyen, Rajesh Ranganath

Feature attributions attempt to highlight what inputs drive predictive power. Good attributions or explanations are thus those that produce inputs that retain this predictive power; accordingly, evaluations of explanations score their quality of prediction. However, evaluations produce scores better than what appears possible from the values in the explanation for a class of explanations, called encoding explanations. Probing for encoding remains a challenge because there is no general characterization of what gives the extra predictive power. We develop a definition of encoding that identifies this extra predictive power via conditional dependence and show that the definition fits existing examples of encoding. This definition implies, in contrast to encoding explanations, that non-encoding explanations contain all the informative inputs used to produce the explanation, giving them a "what you see is what you get" property, which makes them transparent and simple to use. Next, we prove that existing scores (ROAR, FRESH, EVAL-X) do not rank non-encoding explanations above encoding ones, and develop STRIPE-X which ranks them correctly. After empirically demonstrating the theoretical insights, we use STRIPE-X to show that despite prompting an LLM to produce non-encoding explanations for a sentiment analysis task, the LLM-generated explanations encode.