Geoffrey Irving

Tomek Korbak, Mikita Balesni, Elizabeth Barnes et al. · deepmind

AI systems that "think" in human language offer a unique opportunity for AI safety: we can monitor their chains of thought (CoT) for the intent to misbehave. Like all other known AI oversight methods, CoT monitoring is imperfect and allows some misbehavior to go unnoticed. Nevertheless, it shows promise and we recommend further research into CoT monitorability and investment in CoT monitoring alongside existing safety methods. Because CoT monitorability may be fragile, we recommend that frontier model developers consider the impact of development decisions on CoT monitorability.

Tomek Korbak, Joshua Clymer, Benjamin Hilton et al.

As LLM agents gain a greater capacity to cause harm, AI developers might increasingly rely on control measures such as monitoring to justify that they are safe. We sketch how developers could construct a "control safety case", which is a structured argument that models are incapable of subverting control measures in order to cause unacceptable outcomes. As a case study, we sketch an argument that a hypothetical LLM agent deployed internally at an AI company won't exfiltrate sensitive information. The sketch relies on evidence from a "control evaluation,"' where a red team deliberately designs models to exfiltrate data in a proxy for the deployment environment. The safety case then hinges on several claims: (1) the red team adequately elicits model capabilities to exfiltrate data, (2) control measures remain at least as effective in deployment, and (3) developers conservatively extrapolate model performance to predict the probability of data exfiltration in deployment. This safety case sketch is a step toward more concrete arguments that can be used to show that a dangerously capable LLM agent is safe to deploy.

Kyle O'Brien, Stephen Casper, Quentin Anthony et al.

Open-weight AI systems offer unique benefits, including enhanced transparency, open research, and decentralized access. However, they are vulnerable to tampering attacks which can efficiently elicit harmful behaviors by modifying weights or activations. Currently, there is not yet a robust science of open-weight model risk management. Existing safety fine-tuning methods and other post-training techniques have struggled to make LLMs resistant to more than a few dozen steps of adversarial fine-tuning. In this paper, we investigate whether filtering text about dual-use topics from training data can prevent unwanted capabilities and serve as a more tamper-resistant safeguard. We introduce a multi-stage pipeline for scalable data filtering and show that it offers a tractable and effective method for minimizing biothreat proxy knowledge in LLMs. We pretrain multiple 6.9B-parameter models from scratch and find that they exhibit substantial resistance to adversarial fine-tuning attacks on up to 10,000 steps and 300M tokens of biothreat-related text -- outperforming existing post-training baselines by over an order of magnitude -- with no observed degradation to unrelated capabilities. However, while filtered models lack internalized dangerous knowledge, we find that they can still leverage such information when it is provided in context (e.g., via search tool augmentation), demonstrating a need for a defense-in-depth approach. Overall, these findings help to establish pretraining data curation as a promising layer of defense for open-weight AI systems.

Marie Davidsen Buhl, Jacob Pfau, Benjamin Hilton et al.

If AI systems match or exceed human capabilities on a wide range of tasks, it may become difficult for humans to efficiently judge their actions -- making it hard to use human feedback to steer them towards desirable traits. One proposed solution is to leverage another superhuman system to point out flaws in the system's outputs via a debate. This paper outlines the value of debate for AI safety, as well as the assumptions and further research required to make debate work. It does so by sketching an ``alignment safety case'' -- an argument that an AI system will not autonomously take actions which could lead to egregious harm, despite being able to do so. The sketch focuses on the risk of an AI R\&D agent inside an AI company sabotaging research, for example by producing false results. To prevent this, the agent is trained via debate, subject to exploration guarantees, to teach the system to be honest. Honesty is maintained throughout deployment via online training. The safety case rests on four key claims: (1) the agent has become good at the debate game, (2) good performance in the debate game implies that the system is mostly honest, (3) the system will not become significantly less honest during deployment, and (4) the deployment context is tolerant of some errors. We identify open research problems that, if solved, could render this a compelling argument that an AI system is safe.

Tomek Korbak, Mikita Balesni, Buck Shlegeris et al.

As LLM agents grow more capable of causing harm autonomously, AI developers will rely on increasingly sophisticated control measures to prevent possibly misaligned agents from causing harm. AI developers could demonstrate that their control measures are sufficient by running control evaluations: testing exercises in which a red team produces agents that try to subvert control measures. To ensure control evaluations accurately capture misalignment risks, the affordances granted to this red team should be adapted to the capability profiles of the agents to be deployed under control measures. In this paper we propose a systematic framework for adapting affordances of red teams to advancing AI capabilities. Rather than assuming that agents will always execute the best attack strategies known to humans, we demonstrate how knowledge of an agents's actual capability profile can inform proportional control evaluations, resulting in more practical and cost-effective control measures. We illustrate our framework by considering a sequence of five fictional models (M1-M5) with progressively advanced capabilities, defining five distinct AI control levels (ACLs). For each ACL, we provide example rules for control evaluation, control measures, and safety cases that could be appropriate. Finally, we show why constructing a compelling AI control safety case for superintelligent LLM agents will require research breakthroughs, highlighting that we might eventually need alternative approaches to mitigating misalignment risk.