This paper proposes a simple yet effective jailbreak attack named FlipAttack against black-box LLMs. First, from the autoregressive nature, we reveal that LLMs tend to understand the text from left to right and find that they struggle to comprehend the text when noise is added to the left side. Motivated by these insights, we propose to disguise the harmful prompt by constructing left-side noise merely based on the prompt itself, then generalize this idea to 4 flipping modes. Second, we verify the strong ability of LLMs to perform the text-flipping task, and then develop 4 variants to guide LLMs to denoise, understand, and execute harmful behaviors accurately. These designs keep FlipAttack universal, stealthy, and simple, allowing it to jailbreak black-box LLMs within only 1 query. Experiments on 8 LLMs demonstrate the superiority of FlipAttack. Remarkably, it achieves $\sim$98\% attack success rate on GPT-4o, and $\sim$98\% bypass rate against 5 guardrail models on average. The codes are available at GitHub\footnote{https://github.com/yueliu1999/FlipAttack}.
Modern language models (LMs) have been successfully employed in source code generation and understanding, leading to a significant increase in research focused on learning-based code intelligence, such as automated bug repair, and test case generation. Despite their great potential, language models for code intelligence (LM4Code) are susceptible to potential pitfalls, which hinder realistic performance and further impact their reliability and applicability in real-world deployment. Such challenges drive the need for a comprehensive understanding - not just identifying these issues but delving into their possible implications and existing solutions to build more reliable language models tailored to code intelligence. Based on a well-defined systematic research approach, we conducted an extensive literature review to uncover the pitfalls inherent in LM4Code. Finally, 67 primary studies from top-tier venues have been identified. After carefully examining these studies, we designed a taxonomy of pitfalls in LM4Code research and conducted a systematic study to summarize the issues, implications, current solutions, and challenges of different pitfalls for LM4Code systems. We developed a comprehensive classification scheme that dissects pitfalls across four crucial aspects: data collection and labeling, system design and learning, performance evaluation, and deployment and maintenance. Through this study, we aim to provide a roadmap for researchers and practitioners, facilitating their understanding and utilization of LM4Code in reliable and trustworthy ways.
In high-energy physics, anti-neutrons ($\bar{n}$) are fundamental particles that frequently appear as final-state particles, and the reconstruction of their kinematic properties provides an important probe for understanding the governing principles. However, this confronts significant challenges instrumentally with the electromagnetic calorimeter (EMC), a typical experimental sensor but recovering the information of incident $\bar{n}$ insufficiently. In this study, we introduce Vision Calorimeter (ViC), a baseline method for anti-neutron reconstruction that leverages deep learning detectors to analyze the implicit relationships between EMC responses and incident $\bar{n}$ characteristics. Our motivation lies in that energy distributions of $\bar{n}$ samples deposited in the EMC cell arrays embody rich contextual information. Converted to 2-D images, such contextual energy distributions can be used to predict the status of $\bar{n}$ ($i.e.$, incident position and momentum) through a deep learning detector along with pseudo bounding boxes and a specified training objective. Experimental results demonstrate that ViC substantially outperforms the conventional reconstruction approach, reducing the prediction error of incident position by 42.81% (from 17.31$^{\circ}$ to 9.90$^{\circ}$). More importantly, this study for the first time realizes the measurement of incident $\bar{n}$ momentum, underscoring the potential of deep learning detectors for particle reconstruction. Code is available at https://github.com/yuhongtian17/ViC.
Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) with full system access enable powerful task automation but pose significant security and privacy risks due to their ability to manipulate files, access user data, and execute arbitrary commands. While prior work has focused on browser-based agents and HTML-level attacks, the vulnerabilities of CUAs remain underexplored. In this paper, we investigate Visual Prompt Injection (VPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are visually embedded within rendered user interfaces, and examine their impact on both CUAs and Browser-Use Agents (BUAs). We propose VPI-Bench, a benchmark of 306 test cases across five widely used platforms, to evaluate agent robustness under VPI threats. Each test case is a variant of a web platform, designed to be interactive, deployed in a realistic environment, and containing a visually embedded malicious prompt. Our empirical study shows that current CUAs and BUAs can be deceived at rates of up to 51% and 100%, respectively, on certain platforms. The experimental results also indicate that system prompt defenses offer only limited improvements. These findings highlight the need for robust, context-aware defenses to ensure the safe deployment of multimodal AI agents in real-world environments. The code and dataset are available at: https://github.com/cua-framework/agents
Molecular relational learning (MRL) is crucial for understanding the interaction behaviors between molecular pairs, a critical aspect of drug discovery and development. However, the large feasible model space of MRL poses significant challenges to benchmarking, and existing MRL frameworks face limitations in flexibility and scope. To address these challenges, avoid repetitive coding efforts, and ensure fair comparison of models, we introduce FlexMol, a comprehensive toolkit designed to facilitate the construction and evaluation of diverse model architectures across various datasets and performance metrics. FlexMol offers a robust suite of preset model components, including 16 drug encoders, 13 protein sequence encoders, 9 protein structure encoders, and 7 interaction layers. With its easy-to-use API and flexibility, FlexMol supports the dynamic construction of over 70, 000 distinct combinations of model architectures. Additionally, we provide detailed benchmark results and code examples to demonstrate FlexMol's effectiveness in simplifying and standardizing MRL model development and comparison.
Recent years have witnessed the emerging trend of extensions in modern Integrated Development Environments (IDEs) like Visual Studio Code (VSCode) that significantly enhance developer productivity. Especially, popular AI coding assistants like GitHub Copilot and Tabnine provide conveniences like automated code completion and debugging. While these extensions offer numerous benefits, they may introduce privacy and security concerns to software developers. However, there is no existing work that systematically analyzes the security and privacy concerns, including the risks of data exposure in VSCode extensions. In this paper, we investigate on the security issues of cross-extension interactions in VSCode and shed light on the vulnerabilities caused by data exposure among different extensions. Our study uncovers high-impact security flaws that could allow adversaries to stealthily acquire or manipulate credential-related data (e.g., passwords, API keys, access tokens) from other extensions if not properly handled by extension vendors. To measure their prevalence, we design a novel automated risk detection framework that leverages program analysis and natural language processing techniques to automatically identify potential risks in VSCode extensions. By applying our tool to 27,261 real-world VSCode extensions, we discover that 8.5% of them (i.e., 2,325 extensions) are exposed to credential-related data leakage through various vectors, such as commands, user input, and configurations. Our study sheds light on the security challenges and flaws of the extension-in-IDE paradigm and provides suggestions and recommendations for improving the security of VSCode extensions and mitigating the risks of data exposure.