Isabel Wagner

Adam Jenkins, Agnieszka Kitkowska, Caterina Maidhof et al.

We present key challenges and future research directions in the security and privacy of agentic AI, based on a horizon-scanning exercise that brought together thirty leading international experts from academia, industry, and government to engage in focused discussions and collaborative exercises on the emerging risks associated with the growing agency of AI.

Shiva Parsarad, Parth Shandilya, Isabel Wagner

Medical image segmentation is widely used for disease detection but relies on sensitive data, raising privacy concerns as trained models can leak information. Differential privacy, typically implemented via Differential Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DPSGD), provides a solution, though at the cost of reduced utility. Recent DPSGD variants, including Automatic clipping (Auto-S), Normalised SGD with perturbation (NSGD), and Per-sample adaptive clipping (PSAC), have shown promise in image classification, but their behavior in medical segmentation remains underexplored. We evaluate these methods across binary and multi-class tasks and analyze gradient alignment, showing that prior assumptions, particularly for PSAC, do not consistently hold. We further demonstrate that combining clipping strategies with morphological refinement improves segmentation quality under privacy constraints. Finally, we propose an adaptive DP-Morph variant that captures class-specific structures and enhances performance in multi-class settings.

Saskia Laura Schröer, Giovanni Apruzzese, Soheil Human et al.

Our society increasingly benefits from Artificial Intelligence (AI). Unfortunately, more and more evidence shows that AI is also used for offensive purposes. Prior works have revealed various examples of use cases in which the deployment of AI can lead to violation of security and privacy objectives. No extant work, however, has been able to draw a holistic picture of the offensive potential of AI. In this SoK paper we seek to lay the ground for a systematic analysis of the heterogeneous capabilities of offensive AI. In particular we (i) account for AI risks to both humans and systems while (ii) consolidating and distilling knowledge from academic literature, expert opinions, industrial venues, as well as laypeople -- all of which being valuable sources of information on offensive AI. To enable alignment of such diverse sources of knowledge, we devise a common set of criteria reflecting essential technological factors related to offensive AI. With the help of such criteria, we systematically analyze: 95 research papers; 38 InfoSec briefings (from, e.g., BlackHat); the responses of a user study (N=549) entailing individuals with diverse backgrounds and expertise; and the opinion of 12 experts. Our contributions not only reveal concerning ways (some of which overlooked by prior work) in which AI can be offensively used today, but also represent a foothold to address this threat in the years to come.