Matthew Stephenson

2papers

2 Papers

6.7LGJun 15
A Unified Causal-Origin Taxonomy of Distributional Shifts in Reinforcement Learning

Ardianto Wibowo, Paulo E Santos, Amer Baghdadi et al.

Reinforcement learning (RL) systems often degrade when operating conditions differ from those previously encountered, reflecting distributional shifts in the underlying data-generating process. Such shifts may occur between training and evaluation, as in In-Distribution (ID) and Out-of-Distribution (OOD) generalization, or within non-stationary settings where environment dynamics evolve over time. However, the formal relationship between these views remains unclear, and existing work mainly focuses on mitigation rather than the causal origin of shift within the agent-environment interaction. This work develops a unified causal-origin taxonomy that characterizes sources of distributional shift in RL and relates ID/OOD generalization to non-stationary settings. We transfer the classical dataset-shift principle from supervised learning to RL by reformulating distributional shift in terms of the generative interaction process. Using a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), we decompose the interaction into structural components, including the state distribution, observation process, policy, reward, and transition dynamics, together with the shifted-time boundary. The proposed taxonomy distinguishes internal, agent-driven, and external, environment-driven, distributional shifts. The shifted-time boundary perspective further characterizes explicit, implicit, and hybrid shifts. This formulation unifies ID/OOD generalization and non-stationarity as structured changes in the underlying process. We also introduce an evaluation framework for measuring shift impact and adaptation through performance degradation and recovery metrics. By grounding distributional shift in the causal-origin structure of RL, this work supports systematic analysis of robustness under distributional shift.

3.3THFeb 11, 2025
NDAI Agreements

Matthew Stephenson, Andrew Miller, Xyn Sun et al.

We study a fundamental challenge in the economics of innovation: an inventor must reveal details of a new idea to secure compensation or funding, yet such disclosure risks expropriation. We present a model in which a seller (inventor) and buyer (investor) bargain over an information good under the threat of hold-up. In the classical setting, the seller withholds disclosure to avoid misappropriation, leading to inefficiency. We show that trusted execution environments (TEEs) combined with AI agents can mitigate and even fully eliminate this hold-up problem. By delegating the disclosure and payment decisions to tamper-proof programs, the seller can safely reveal the invention without risking expropriation, achieving full disclosure and an efficient ex post transfer. Moreover, even if the invention's value exceeds a threshold that TEEs can fully secure, partial disclosure still improves outcomes compared to no disclosure. Recognizing that real AI agents are imperfect, we model "agent errors" in payments or disclosures and demonstrate that budget caps and acceptance thresholds suffice to preserve most of the efficiency gains. Our results imply that cryptographic or hardware-based solutions can function as an "ironclad NDA," substantially mitigating the fundamental disclosure-appropriation paradox first identified by Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959). This has far-reaching policy implications for fostering R&D, technology transfer, and collaboration.