Minas Marios Sotiriou

Sotiris Kanellopoulos, Edouard Nemery, Christos Pergaminelis et al.

The concept of fair orientations in graphs was introduced by Christodoulou, Fiat, Koutsoupias, and Sgouritsa in 2023, naturally modeling fair division scenarios in which resources are only contested by neighbors. In this model, vertices represent agents and undirected edges represent goods; edges have to be oriented towards one of their endpoints, i.e., allocated to one of their adjacent agents. Although EFX orientations (envy-free up to any good) have been extensively studied in this setting, EF orientations (envy-free) remain unexplored. In this work, we initiate their study, mostly under the lens of parameterized complexity, presenting various tractable cases, hardness results, and parameterizations. Our results concern both simple graphs and multigraphs. Interestingly, many of our results transfer to EFX orientations, thus complementing and improving upon previous work; notably, we answer an open question regarding the structural parameterized complexity of the latter problem on graphs of polynomially-bounded valuations. We also show that EF orientations are tractable in cases in which EFX orientations are not, particularly for binary valuations. Lastly, we consider charity in the orientation setting, establishing algorithms for finding the minimum amount of edges that have to be removed from a graph in order for EF(X) orientations to exist.

Ioannis Kakatelis, Thanasis Lianeas, Alkmini Sgouritsa et al.

We study the existence of envy-free-up-to-any-good (EFX) allocations of indivisible goods among agents with heterogeneous monotone valuations. Christodoulou et al. (2023) introduced the (multi-hyper)graph setting, where agents and goods are represented by vertices and edges of a graph respectively, and only the endpoints of an edge may have non-zero marginal value for it. Our work simplifies and extends previous results of Kaviani et al. (Alireza Kaviani, Masoud Seddighin, Amir Mohammad Shahrezaei. Almost Envy-Free Allocation of Indivisible Goods: A Tale of Two Valuations. WINE 2024) in this domain. First, we provide a simpler construction of EF2X allocation for general monotone valuations in hypergraphs with girth at least 3. We extend our ideas when the multiplicity of each edge is 2 and show that an EF3X allocation always exists for additive valuations. Both results can be constructed in polynomial time. Regarding EFX approximations, we provide a simpler construction for $\frac{\sqrt{2}}{2}$-EFX allocations in hypergraphs of girth at least 3 under subadditive valuations. We push the state-of-the-art by establishing the existence of $\frac{2}{3}$-EFX allocations for additive valuations when the edge multiplicity is 2. Both of the latter results can be constructed in pseudo-polynomial time. By addressing these multi-hypergraph settings, our work contributes to the ongoing effort to resolve the existence of EFX in increasingly general and applicable domains.

Alkmini Sgouritsa, Minas Marios Sotiriou

We study the problem of "fairly" dividing indivisible goods to several agents that have valuation set functions over the sets of goods. As fair we consider the allocations that are envy-free up to any good (EFX), i.e., no agent envies any proper subset of the goods given to any other agent. The existence or not of EFX allocations is a major open problem in Fair Division, and there are only positive results for special cases. [George Christodoulou, Amos Fiat, Elias Koutsoupias, Alkmini Sgouritsa 2023] introduced a restriction on the agents' valuations according to a graph structure: the vertices correspond to agents and the edges to goods, and each vertex/agent has zero marginal value (or in other words, they are indifferent) for the edges/goods that are not adjacent to them. The existence of EFX allocations has been shown for simple graphs with general monotone valuations [George Christodoulou, Amos Fiat, Elias Koutsoupias, Alkmini Sgouritsa 2023], and for multigraphs for restricted additive valuations [Alireza Kaviani, Masoud Seddighin, Amir Mohammad Shahrezaei 2024]. In this work, we push the state-of-the-art further, and show that the EFX allocations always exists in multigraphs and general monotone valuations if any of the following three conditions hold: either (a) the multigraph is bipartite, or (b) each agent has at most $\lceil \frac{n}{4} \rceil -1$ neighbors, where $n$ is the total number of agents, or (c) the shortest cycle with non-parallel edges has length at least 6.