Lixia Zhang

Zhiyi Zhang, Siqi Liu, Randy King et al.

Modern digitally controlled systems require multiparty authentication and authorization to meet the desired security requirement. This paper describes the design and development of NDN-MPS, an automated solution to support multiparty signature signing and verification for NDN-enabled applications. NDN-MPS suggests several changes and extensions to the existing NDN security solutions. First, it introduces a new type of trust schema to support signing and verification for multiple signers under complex policies such as threshold schemes. Second, it extends the NDN signature format to accommodate multisignature schemes such as BLS signature. Third, it introduces a signature collection protocol to solicit signatures securely from multiple signers. We further evaluate NDN-MPS by assessing its security properties and measuring its performance.

Zhiyi Zhang, Su Yong Wong, Junxiao Shi et al.

Named Data Networking (NDN) secures network communications by requiring all data packets to be signed when produced. This requirement necessitates efficient and usable mechanisms to handle NDN certificate issuance and revocation, making these supporting mechanisms essential for NDN operations. In this paper, we first investigate and clarify core concepts related to NDN certificates and security design in general, and then present the model of NDN certificate management and its desired properties. We proceed with the design of a specific realization of NDN's certificate management, NDNCERT, evaluate it using a formal security analysis, and discuss the challenges in designing, implementing, and deploying the system, to share our experiences with other NDN security protocol development efforts.

Zhiyi Zhang, Michał Król, Alberto Sonnino et al.

We introduce EL PASSO, a privacy-preserving, asynchronous Single Sign-On (SSO) system. It enables personal authentication while protecting users' privacy against both identity providers and relying parties, and allows selective attribute disclosure. EL PASSO is based on anonymous credentials, yet it supports users' accountability. Selected authorities may recover the identity of allegedly misbehaving users, and users can prove properties about their identity without revealing it in the clear. EL PASSO does not require specific secure hardware or a third party (other than existing participants in SSO). The generation and use of authentication credentials are asynchronous, allowing users to sign on when identity providers are temporarily unavailable. We evaluate EL PASSO in a distributed environment and prove its low computational cost, yielding faster sign-on operations than OIDC from a regular laptop, one-second user-perceived latency from a low-power device, and scaling to more than 50 sign-on operations per second at a relying party using a single 4-core server in the cloud.

Zhiyi Zhang, Yu Guan, Xinyu Ma et al.

As Personally Identifiable Information (PII) data sharing among multiple parties becomes increasingly common, so does the potential for data leakage. As required by new data protection regulations and laws, when PII leakage occurs, one must be able to reliably identify the leaking sources. Existing solutions utilize watermark technologies or data object allocation strategies to differentiate the data shared with different parties to identify potential leakers. However, these solutions lose their effectiveness under several attack scenarios, e.g., a data sender may leak the data and a receiver may deny the reception of certain shared data. Worse yet, multiple receivers might collude and apply a set of operations such as intersection, complement, and union to their received datasets before leaking them, making the task of leaker identification even more difficult. In this paper, we propose AuditShare, a PII dataset sharing system with reliable leaking source identification. Firstly, taking advantage of the intrinsic properties of PII data, AuditShare allocates data objects to individual sharing parties by PII attributes. Secondly, AuditShare obliviously transfers data between the sender and each receiver and uses a Merkle Tree as an immutable record of the sharing. Thirdly, a knowledge-based identification algorithm is proposed to identify a guilty sender or colluding/non-colluding receivers. Through our evaluation, we show that: (i) With a modest amount of leaked data, AuditShare can accurately (accuracy>99.99%) and undeniably identify all the guilty parties in different cases; (ii) It only takes 0.5 second to share 100,000 data objects in AuditShare, which is practical in real-world deployment.

Eric Osterweil, Angelos Stavrou, Lixia Zhang

Botnet Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are now 20 years old; what has changed in that time? Their disruptive presence, their volume, distribution across the globe, and the relative ease of launching them have all been trending in favor of attackers. Our increases in network capacity and our architectural design principles are making our online world richer, but are favoring attackers at least as much as Internet services. The DDoS mitigation techniques have been evolving but they are losing ground to the increasing sophistication and diversification of the attacks that have moved from the network to the application level, and we are operationally falling behind attackers. It is time to ask fundamental questions: are there core design issues in our network architecture that fundamentally enable DDoS attacks? How can our network infrastructure be enhanced to address the principles that enable the DDoS problem? How can we incentivize the development and deployment of the necessary changes? In this article, we want to sound an alarm and issue a call to action to the research community. We propose that basic research and principled analyses are badly needed, because the status quo does not paint a pretty picture for the future.

Zhiyi Zhang, Vishrant Vasavada, Siva Kesava Reddy Kakarla et al.

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have plagued the Internet for decades, but the basic defense approaches have not fundamentally changed. Rather, the size and rate of growth in attacks have actually outpaced carriers' and DDoS mitigation services' growth, calling for new solutions that can be, partially or fully, deployed imminently and exhibit effectiveness. In this paper, we examine the basic functions in Named Data Networking (NDN), a newly proposed Internet architecture, that can address the principle weaknesses in today's IP networks. We demonstrate by a new DDoS mitigation solution over NDN, Fine-grained Interest Traffic Throttling FITT, that NDN's architectural changes, even when incrementally deployed, can make DDoS attacks fundamentally more difficult to launch and less effective. FITT leverages the NDN design to enable the network to detect DDoS from victim's feedback, throttles DDoS traffic by reverse its exact paths through the network, and enforces control over the misbehaving entities at their sources. Our extensive simulation results show that FITT can throttle attack traffic with one-way time delay from the victim to the NDN gateway; upon activation, FITT effectively stop attack traffic from impacting benign flows, resulting in over 99\% of packets reaching victims being legitimate ones. We further demonstrate that service providers may implement NDN/FITT on existing CDN nodes as an incrementally deployable solution to effectuate the application level remediation at the sources, which remains unattainable in today's DDoS mitigation approaches.

Zhiyi Zhang, Vishrant Vasavada, Xinyu Ma et al.

With the ever growing Internet of Things (IoT) market, ledger systems are facing new challenges to efficiently store and secure enormous customer records collected by the IoT devices. The authenticity, availability, and integrity of these records are critically important for both business providers and customers. In this paper, we describe DLedger, a lightweight and resilient distributed ledger system. Instead of a single chain of blocks, DLedger builds the ledger over a directed acyclic graph (DAG), so that its operations can tolerate network partition and intermittent connectivity. Instead of compute-intensive Proof-of-Work (PoW), DLedger utilizes Proof-of-Authentication (PoA), whose light-weight operations are IoT-friendly, to achieve consensus. Furthermore, DLedger is built upon a data-centric network called Named Data Networking (NDN), which facilitates the peer-to-peer data dissemination in heterogeneous IoT networks.

Paolo Gasti, Gene Tsudik, Ersin Uzun et al.

With the growing realization that current Internet protocols are reaching the limits of their senescence, a number of on-going research efforts aim to design potential next-generation Internet architectures. Although they vary in maturity and scope, in order to avoid past pitfalls, these efforts seek to treat security and privacy as fundamental requirements. Resilience to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that plague today's Internet is a major issue for any new architecture and deserves full attention. In this paper, we focus on DoS in a specific candidate next-generation Internet architecture called Named-Data Networking (NDN) -- an instantiation of Information-Centric Networking approach. By stressing content dissemination, NDN appears to be attractive and viable approach to many types of current and emerging communication models. It also incorporates some basic security features that mitigate certain attacks. However, NDN's resilience to DoS attacks has not been analyzed to-date. This paper represents the first step towards assessment and possible mitigation of DoS in NDN. After identifying and analyzing several new types of attacks, it investigates their variations, effects and counter-measures. This paper also sheds some light on the long-standing debate about relative virtues of self-certifying, as opposed to human-readable, names.