P. M. Aronow

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2papers

2 Papers

LGOct 9, 2025
Using LLMs to Directly Guess Conditional Expectations Can Improve Efficiency in Causal Estimation

Chris Engh, P. M. Aronow

We propose a simple yet effective use of LLM-powered AI tools to improve causal estimation. In double machine learning, the accuracy of causal estimates of the effect of a treatment on an outcome in the presence of a high-dimensional confounder depends on the performance of estimators of conditional expectation functions. We show that predictions made by generative models trained on historical data can be used to improve the performance of these estimators relative to approaches that solely rely on adjusting for embeddings extracted from these models. We argue that the historical knowledge and reasoning capacities associated with these generative models can help overcome curse-of-dimensionality problems in causal inference problems. We consider a case study using a small dataset of online jewelry auctions, and demonstrate that inclusion of LLM-generated guesses as predictors can improve efficiency in estimation.

LGMay 24, 2023
Operationalizing Counterfactual Metrics: Incentives, Ranking, and Information Asymmetry

Serena Wang, Stephen Bates, P. M. Aronow et al.

From the social sciences to machine learning, it has been well documented that metrics to be optimized are not always aligned with social welfare. In healthcare, Dranove et al. (2003) showed that publishing surgery mortality metrics actually harmed the welfare of sicker patients by increasing provider selection behavior. We analyze the incentive misalignments that arise from such average treated outcome metrics, and show that the incentives driving treatment decisions would align with maximizing total patient welfare if the metrics (i) accounted for counterfactual untreated outcomes and (ii) considered total welfare instead of averaging over treated patients. Operationalizing this, we show how counterfactual metrics can be modified to behave reasonably in patient-facing ranking systems. Extending to realistic settings when providers observe more about patients than the regulatory agencies do, we bound the decay in performance by the degree of information asymmetry between principal and agent. In doing so, our model connects principal-agent information asymmetry with unobserved heterogeneity in causal inference.