Anna C. M. Thöni

Anna C. M. Thöni, Grégoire Lambrecht, Gökçe Dayanıklı et al.

Mean field games efficiently approximate a very large population of strategic agents. While these games can aid the understanding of complex systems, their deployment in real-world settings is challenged by the specification of their parameters: mean field games (MFGs) often involve hidden preferences, constraints, and interactions that can rarely be theoretically derived or directly observed. To address this gap, we present a neural network-based framework for learning parametric, finite-state MFGs from observed population dynamics. To do so, we formulate the parameter calibration as an inverse problem and use implicit differentiation to backpropagate through the games' equilibrium. The resulting approach is fully differentiable and enables us to estimate flexible trajectory-wise parameter paths, including state- and time-dependent specifications without requiring observations of the individual agents' actions or rewards. We provide a proof for the exactness of the gradient computation in a discrete-time formulation. We validate our framework through numerical experiments across four systems of increasing complexity, ranging from synthetic linear-quadratic benchmarks to real-world urban mobility datasets.

Anna C. M. Thöni, William E. Robinson, Yoram Bachrach et al.

In chemical reaction network theory, ordinary differential equations are used to model the temporal change of chemical species concentration. As the functional form of these ordinary differential equations systems is derived from an empirical model of the reaction network, it may be incomplete. Our approach aims to elucidate these hidden insights in the reaction network by combining dynamic modelling with deep learning in the form of neural ordinary differential equations. Our contributions not only help to identify the shortcomings of existing empirical models but also assist the design of future reaction networks.

Anna C. M. Thöni, Yoram Bachrach, Tal Kachman

Mean-field game theory relies on approximating games that are intractible to model due to a very large to infinite population of players. While these kinds of games can be solved analytically via the associated system of partial derivatives, this approach is not model-free, can lead to the loss of the existence or uniqueness of solutions, and may suffer from modelling bias. To reduce the dependency between the model and the game, we introduce neural mean-field games: a combination of mean-field game theory and deep learning in the form of neural stochastic differential equations. The resulting model is data-driven, lightweight, and can learn extensive strategic interactions that are hard to capture using mean-field theory alone. In addition, the model is based on automatic differentiation, making it more robust and objective than approaches based on finite differences. We highlight the efficiency and flexibility of our approach by solving two mean-field games that vary in their complexity, observability, and the presence of noise. Lastly, we illustrate the model's robustness by simulating viral dynamics based on real-world data. Here, we demonstrate that the model's ability to learn from real-world data helps to accurately model the evolution of an epidemic outbreak. Using these results, we show that the model is flexible, generalizable, and requires few observations to learn the distribution underlying the data.