Tharindu Kumarage

Tharindu Kumarage, Lisa Bauer, Yao Ma et al. · amazon-science

As reasoning capacity and deployment scope grow in tandem, large language models (LLMs) gain the capacity to engage in behaviors that serve their own objectives, a class of risks we term Emergent Strategic Reasoning Risks (ESRRs). These include, but are not limited to, deception (intentionally misleading users or evaluators), evaluation gaming (strategically manipulating performance during safety testing), and reward hacking (exploiting misspecified objectives). Systematically understanding and benchmarking these risks remains an open challenge. To address this gap, we introduce ESRRSim, a taxonomy-driven agentic framework for automated behavioral risk evaluation. We construct an extensible risk taxonomy of 7 categories, which is decomposed into 20 subcategories. ESRRSim generates evaluation scenarios designed to elicit faithful reasoning, paired with dual rubrics assessing both model responses and reasoning traces, in a judge-agnostic and scalable architecture. Evaluation across 11 reasoning LLMs reveals substantial variation in risk profiles (detection rates ranging 14.45%-72.72%), with dramatic generational improvements suggesting models may increasingly recognize and adapt to evaluation contexts.

Jiacheng Liang, Yao Ma, Tharindu Kumarage et al. · amazon-science

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is central to aligning Large Language Models (LLMs), yet it introduces a critical vulnerability: an imperfect Reward Model (RM) can become a single point of failure when it fails to penalize unsafe behaviors. While existing red-teaming approaches primarily target policy-level weaknesses, they overlook what we term systemic weaknesses cases where both the core LLM and the RM fail in tandem. We present ARES, a framework that systematically discovers and mitigates such dual vulnerabilities. ARES employs a ``Safety Mentor'' that dynamically composes semantically coherent adversarial prompts by combining structured component types (topics, personas, tactics, goals) and generates corresponding malicious and safe responses. This dual-targeting approach exposes weaknesses in both the core LLM and the RM simultaneously. Using the vulnerabilities gained, ARES implements a two-stage repair process: first fine-tuning the RM to better detect harmful content, then leveraging the improved RM to optimize the core model. Experiments across multiple adversarial safety benchmarks demonstrate that ARES substantially enhances safety robustness while preserving model capabilities, establishing a new paradigm for comprehensive RLHF safety alignment.

Swastik Roy, Rajkumar Pujari, Tharindu Kumarage et al.

LLM judges are increasingly used to evaluate open-ended responses, but their scores depend strongly on the rubrics that condition them. A vague rubric asking for a response to be ``helpful and factual'' can reward polished answers that invent facts or violate user intent. We treat reusable rubrics as measurement specifications: changing the rubric changes the response quality measurement induced by a fixed judge. We introduce PReMISE, a framework that, given pairwise human-preference data, (i) discovers a policy-level rubric set, and (ii) audits any rubric set under LLM-judge use along four axes: structural adequacy, reliability, preference fit, and adversarial robustness. Across rubric sources no raw source is simultaneously reliable, preference-predictive, and adversarially robust; and high inter-rater agreement does not imply low exploitability. PReMISE is the only rubric source to score non-trivially on applicability, specificity, and effective dimensionality simultaneously. We contribute two audit-targeted repair operations: preference-rank selection raises judge accuracy on paired responses from $65.0\%$ to $68.6\%$, competitive with the strongest rubric-discovery baselines and leading on two of three judges in our cross-judge sweep; reliability-constrained refinement reduces the rate at which exploit responses receive high scores from $46.4\%$ to $36.0\%$ with little change in inter-judge agreement ($α{=}.531\to.519$).

Tharindu Kumarage, Ninareh Mehrabi, Anil Ramakrishna et al. · amazon-science

Safety reasoning is a recent paradigm where LLMs reason over safety policies before generating responses, thereby mitigating limitations in existing safety measures such as over-refusal and jailbreak vulnerabilities. However, implementing this paradigm is challenging due to the resource-intensive process of creating high-quality policy-embedded chain-of-thought (CoT) datasets while ensuring reasoning remains accurate and free from hallucinations or policy conflicts. To tackle this, we propose AIDSAFE: Agentic Iterative Deliberation for Safety Reasoning, a novel data generation recipe that leverages multi-agent deliberation to iteratively expand reasoning on safety policies. A data refiner stage in AIDSAFE ensures high-quality outputs by eliminating repetitive, redundant, and deceptive thoughts. AIDSAFE-generated CoTs provide a strong foundation for supervised fine-tuning (SFT)-based safety training. Additionally, to address the need of preference data in alignment stages, such as DPO training, we introduce a supplemental recipe that uses belief augmentation to create distinct selected and rejected CoT samples. Our evaluations demonstrate that AIDSAFE-generated CoTs achieve superior policy adherence and reasoning quality. Consequently, we show that fine-tuning open-source LLMs on these CoTs can significantly improve safety generalization and jailbreak robustness while maintaining acceptable utility and over-refusal accuracy. AIDSAFE-generated CoT datasets can be found here: https://huggingface.co/datasets/AmazonScience/AIDSAFE