Adam M. Kaufman

Derek S. Prijatelj, Samuel Grieggs, Jin Huang et al.

Managing novelty in perception-based human activity recognition (HAR) is critical in realistic settings to improve task performance over time and ensure solution generalization outside of prior seen samples. Novelty manifests in HAR as unseen samples, activities, objects, environments, and sensor changes, among other ways. Novelty may be task-relevant, such as a new class or new features, or task-irrelevant resulting in nuisance novelty, such as never before seen noise, blur, or distorted video recordings. To perform HAR optimally, algorithmic solutions must be tolerant to nuisance novelty, and learn over time in the face of novelty. This paper 1) formalizes the definition of novelty in HAR building upon the prior definition of novelty in classification tasks, 2) proposes an incremental open world learning (OWL) protocol and applies it to the Kinetics datasets to generate a new benchmark KOWL-718, 3) analyzes the performance of current state-of-the-art HAR models when novelty is introduced over time, 4) provides a containerized and packaged pipeline for reproducing the OWL protocol and for modifying for any future updates to Kinetics. The experimental analysis includes an ablation study of how the different models perform under various conditions as annotated by Kinetics-AVA. The protocol as an algorithm for reproducing experiments using the KOWL-718 benchmark will be publicly released with code and containers at https://github.com/prijatelj/human-activity-recognition-in-an-open-world. The code may be used to analyze different annotations and subsets of the Kinetics datasets in an incremental open world fashion, as well as be extended as further updates to Kinetics are released.

Aryan Bhatt, Cody Rushing, Adam Kaufman et al.

Control evaluations measure whether monitoring and security protocols for AI systems prevent intentionally subversive AI models from causing harm. Our work presents the first control evaluation performed in an agent environment. We construct BashBench, a dataset of 257 challenging multi-step system administration tasks, and evaluate whether various safety measures can prevent an adversarially constructed AI agent from covertly downloading and executing malicious code in this environment. This multi-step setting introduces new attack and defense dynamics, which we investigate in order to design novel control protocols that prevent safety failures without hindering the ability of non-malicious agents to perform useful work. We introduce a class of control protocols called resample protocols that dynamically take additional samples of certain actions. We find these protocols significantly improve on existing techniques by selectively blocking the AI agent from executing suspicious code and incriminating the agent by generating additional examples of dangerous behavior. We measure the tradeoff between attack prevention and usefulness; our best protocol combines resampling with analysis of previous steps, reducing the success rate of attacks from 58% to 7% at a 5% cost to the performance of a non-malicious agent.