Peter Wallis

Peter Wallis

The state of the art in human computer conversation leaves something to be desired and, indeed, talking to a computer can be down-right annoying. This paper describes an approach to identifying ``opportunities for improvement'' in these systems by looking for abuse in the form of swear words. The premise is that humans swear at computers as a sanction and, as such, swear words represent a point of failure where the system did not behave as it should. Having identified where things went wrong, we can work backward through the transcripts and, using conversation analysis (CA) work out how things went wrong. Conversation analysis is a qualitative methodology and can appear quite alien - indeed unscientific - to those of us from a quantitative background. The paper starts with a description of Conversation analysis in its modern form, and then goes on to apply the methodology to transcripts of frustrated and annoyed users in the DARPA Communicator project. The conclusion is that there is at least one species of failure caused by the inability of the Communicator systems to handle mixed initiative at the discourse structure level. Along the way, I hope to demonstrate that there is an alternative future for computational linguistics that does not rely on larger and larger text corpora.

Peter Wallis

One hundred years ago Vygotsky and his circle were exploring the nature of consciousness and defining what would become psychology in the Soviet Union. They concluded that children develop "scientific thinking" through interacting with enculturated adults in Zones of Proximal Development or ZPDs. The proposal is that, contrary to the claims of some, the LLM mechanism is not doing thinking with "distributed representations," but rather the completion model is doing "primitive thinking" in terms of *practices*. Viewed from this perspective, it would seem our large language models don't hallucinate, but rather dream, and that what is needed is not "guard rails" but an investigation of the set of cognitive tools that enable us to do things that look like common-sense. The proposal here is that *interaction* is core to human communication rather than just an add-on to "real" understanding.

Peter Wallis

Theory based AI research has had a hard time recently and the aim here is to propose a model of what LLMs are actually doing when they impress us with their language skills. The model integrates three established theories of human decision-making from philosophy, sociology, and computer science. The paper starts with the collective understanding of reasoning from the early days of AI research - primarily because that model is how we humans think we think, and is the most accessible. It then describes what is commonly thought of as "reactive systems" which is the position taken by many philosophers and indeed many contemporary AI researchers. The third component to the proposed model is from sociology and based on the idea that human intelligence is a collective skill for which individuals are merely actors. The resulting model provides an alternate view of ``mind reading'' in human communication.

Peter Wallis

In this paper we apply our understanding of the radical enactivist agenda to the classic AI-hard problem of Natural Language Understanding. When Turing devised his famous test the assumption was that a computer could use language and the challenge would be to mimic human intelligence. It turned out playing chess and formal logic were easy compared to understanding what people say. The techniques of good old-fashioned AI (GOFAI) assume symbolic representation is the core of reasoning and by that paradigm human communication consists of transferring representations from one mind to another. However, one finds that representations appear in another's mind, without appearing in the intermediary language. People communicate by mind reading it seems. Systems with speech interfaces such as Alexa and Siri are of course common, but they are limited. Rather than adding mind reading skills, we introduced a "cheat" that enabled our systems to fake it. The cheat is simple and only slightly interesting to computer scientists and not at all interesting to philosophers. However, reading about the enactivist idea that we "directly perceive" the intentions of others, our cheat took on a new light and in this paper look again at how natural language understanding might actually work between humans.

Peter Wallis

Virtual Personal Assistants like Siri have great potential but such developments hit the fundamental problem of how to make computational devices that understand human speech. Natural language understanding is one of the more disappointing failures of AI research and it seems there is something we computer scientists don't get about the nature of language. Of course philosophers and linguists think quite differently about language and this paper describes how we have taken ideas from other disciplines and implemented them. The background to the work is to take seriously the notion of language as action and look at what people actually do with language using the techniques of Conversation Analysis. The observation has been that human communication is (behind the scenes) about the management of social relations as well as the (foregrounded) passing of information. To claim this is one thing but to implement it requires a mechanism. The mechanism described here is based on the notion of language being intentional - we think intentionally, talk about them and recognise them in others - and cooperative in that we are compelled to help out. The way we are compelled points to a solution to the ever present problem of keeping the human on topic. The approach has led to a recent success in which we significantly improve user satisfaction independent of task completion. Talk Markup Language (TalkML) is a draft alternative to VoiceXML that, we propose, greatly simplifies the scripting of interaction by providing default behaviours for no input and not recognised speech events.

Peter Wallis

As Stefan Kopp and Nicole Kramer say in their recent paper[Frontiers in Psychology 12 (2021) 597], despite some very impressive demonstrations over the last decade or so, we still don't know how how to make a computer have a half decent conversation with a human. They argue that the capabilities required to do this include incremental joint co-construction and mentalizing. Although agreeing whole heartedly with their statement of the problem, this paper argues for a different approach to the solution based on the "new" AI of situated action.