Jacob Russin

Taylor W. Webb, Steven M. Frankland, Awni Altabaa et al.

A central challenge for cognitive science is to explain how abstract concepts are acquired from limited experience. This has often been framed in terms of a dichotomy between connectionist and symbolic cognitive models. Here, we highlight a recently emerging line of work that suggests a novel reconciliation of these approaches, by exploiting an inductive bias that we term the relational bottleneck. In that approach, neural networks are constrained via their architecture to focus on relations between perceptual inputs, rather than the attributes of individual inputs. We review a family of models that employ this approach to induce abstractions in a data-efficient manner, emphasizing their potential as candidate models for the acquisition of abstract concepts in the human mind and brain.

Jacob Russin, Ellie Pavlick, Michael J. Frank

Human learning embodies a striking duality: sometimes, we appear capable of following logical, compositional rules and benefit from structured curricula (e.g., in formal education), while other times, we rely on an incremental approach or trial-and-error, learning better from curricula that are randomly interleaved. Influential psychological theories explain this seemingly disparate behavioral evidence by positing two qualitatively different learning systems -- one for rapid, rule-based inferences and another for slow, incremental adaptation. It remains unclear how to reconcile such theories with neural networks, which learn via incremental weight updates and are thus a natural model for the latter type of learning, but are not obviously compatible with the former. However, recent evidence suggests that metalearning neural networks and large language models are capable of "in-context learning" (ICL) -- the ability to flexibly grasp the structure of a new task from a few examples. Here, we show that the dynamic interplay between ICL and default in-weight learning (IWL) naturally captures a broad range of learning phenomena observed in humans, reproducing curriculum effects on category-learning and compositional tasks, and recapitulating a tradeoff between flexibility and retention. Our work shows how emergent ICL can equip neural networks with fundamentally different learning properties that can coexist with their native IWL, thus offering a novel perspective on dual-process theories and human cognitive flexibility.

Sam Whitman McGrath, Jacob Russin

The multiple realizability thesis holds that psychological states may be implemented in a diversity of physical systems. The deep learning revolution seems to be bringing this possibility to life, offering the most plausible examples of man-made realizations of sophisticated cognitive functions to date. This paper explores the implications of deep learning models for the multiple realizability thesis. Among other things, it challenges the widely held view that multiple realizability entails that the study of the mind can and must be pursued independently of the study of its implementation in the brain or in artificial analogues. Although its central contribution is philosophical, the paper has substantial methodological upshots for contemporary cognitive science, suggesting that deep neural networks may play a crucial role in formulating and evaluating hypotheses about cognition, even if they are interpreted as implementation-level models. In the age of deep learning, multiple realizability possesses a renewed significance.

Jacob Russin, Maryam Zolfaghar, Seongmin A. Park et al.

Neural networks struggle in continual learning settings from catastrophic forgetting: when trials are blocked, new learning can overwrite the learning from previous blocks. Humans learn effectively in these settings, in some cases even showing an advantage of blocking, suggesting the brain contains mechanisms to overcome this problem. Here, we build on previous work and show that neural networks equipped with a mechanism for cognitive control do not exhibit catastrophic forgetting when trials are blocked. We further show an advantage of blocking over interleaving when there is a bias for active maintenance in the control signal, implying a tradeoff between maintenance and the strength of control. Analyses of map-like representations learned by the networks provided additional insights into these mechanisms. Our work highlights the potential of cognitive control to aid continual learning in neural networks, and offers an explanation for the advantage of blocking that has been observed in humans.

Jacob Russin, Roland Fernandez, Hamid Palangi et al.

A longstanding question in cognitive science concerns the learning mechanisms underlying compositionality in human cognition. Humans can infer the structured relationships (e.g., grammatical rules) implicit in their sensory observations (e.g., auditory speech), and use this knowledge to guide the composition of simpler meanings into complex wholes. Recent progress in artificial neural networks has shown that when large models are trained on enough linguistic data, grammatical structure emerges in their representations. We extend this work to the domain of mathematical reasoning, where it is possible to formulate precise hypotheses about how meanings (e.g., the quantities corresponding to numerals) should be composed according to structured rules (e.g., order of operations). Our work shows that neural networks are not only able to infer something about the structured relationships implicit in their training data, but can also deploy this knowledge to guide the composition of individual meanings into composite wholes.

Jacob Russin, Maryam Zolfaghar, Seongmin A. Park et al.

The neural mechanisms supporting flexible relational inferences, especially in novel situations, are a major focus of current research. In the complementary learning systems framework, pattern separation in the hippocampus allows rapid learning in novel environments, while slower learning in neocortex accumulates small weight changes to extract systematic structure from well-learned environments. In this work, we adapt this framework to a task from a recent fMRI experiment where novel transitive inferences must be made according to implicit relational structure. We show that computational models capturing the basic cognitive properties of these two systems can explain relational transitive inferences in both familiar and novel environments, and reproduce key phenomena observed in the fMRI experiment.