David Williams-King

Lennart Wachowiak, Scott D. Blain, David Williams-King et al.

LLMs are increasingly capable of persuasion, which raises the question of how to protect users against manipulation. In a preregistered user study (N=120) across four decision-making scenarios, we find that an adversarial LLM with a hidden goal succeeds in steering users' decisions 65.4% of the time. We then introduce a "warden" model: a secondary LLM that monitors the human-AI interaction trace in real time and issues non-binding, private advisories to the user when it detects manipulation. Adding a warden more than halves the adversary's success rate to 30.4%, with a much smaller (8.6 percentage points) reduction for genuine interactions. To probe the mechanism behind these results, we release COAX-Bench, a simulation benchmark spanning 14 decision-making scenarios, including hiring, voting, and file access. Across 16,212 simulated multi-agent interactions, capable adversarial LLMs achieve their hidden goals in 34.7% of cases, which warden models reduce to 12.3%. Notably, even warden models substantially weaker than the adversary they oversee provide meaningful protection, suggesting a path for scalable oversight of more capable models.

Astha Mehta, Niruthiha Selvanayagam, Cedric Lam et al.

An attacker can split a malicious goal into sub-prompts that each look benign on their own and only become harmful in combination. Existing LLM safety benchmarks evaluate prompts one at a time, or across turns of a single chat, and so do not look for a malicious signal spread across separate sessions with no shared context. We build FragBench, a benchmark drawn from 24 real-world cyber-incident campaigns, which keeps the full attack trail: the multi-fragment kill chain, the per-fragment safety-judge verdicts, sandboxed execution traces, and a matched set of benign cover sessions. FragBench splits this trail into two paired tasks: an adversarial rewriter that hardens fragments against a single-turn safety judge (FragBench Attack), and a graph-based user-level detector trained on the resulting interactions (FragBench Defense). The single-turn judge is near chance on the released corpus by construction, but four GNN variants and three classical-ML baselines all recover the cross-session feature, reaching aggregate event-level F1 = 0.88-0.96. Defending against fragmented LLM misuse therefore requires modeling the cross-session interaction graph, rather than isolated prompts. Our generator, rewriter, sandbox harness, and detector are released at https://github.com/LidaSafety/fragbench.

Linh Le, David Williams-King, Mohamed Amine Merzouk et al.

Current adversarial robustness methods for large language models require extensive datasets of harmful prompts (thousands to hundreds of thousands of examples), yet remain vulnerable to novel attack vectors and distributional shifts. We propose Latent Personality Alignment (LPA), a sample-efficient defense that achieves robustness by training models on abstract personality traits rather than specific harmful behaviors. Using fewer than 100 trait statements and latent adversarial training, LPA achieves comparable attack success rates to methods trained on 150k+ examples, while maintaining superior utility. Critically, LPA generalizes better to unseen attack distributions, reducing misclassification rates by 2.6x compared to baseline across six harm benchmarks -- without ever seeing harmful examples during training. Our results demonstrate that personality-based alignment offers a principled approach to building robust defenses with minimal cost.

Lukasz Bartoszcze, Sarthak Munshi, Bryan Sukidi et al.

Large-language models are capable of completing a variety of tasks, but remain unpredictable and intractable. Representation engineering seeks to resolve this problem through a new approach utilizing samples of contrasting inputs to detect and edit high-level representations of concepts such as honesty, harmfulness or power-seeking. We formalize the goals and methods of representation engineering to present a cohesive picture of work in this emerging discipline. We compare it with alternative approaches, such as mechanistic interpretability, prompt-engineering and fine-tuning. We outline risks such as performance decrease, compute time increases and steerability issues. We present a clear agenda for future research to build predictable, dynamic, safe and personalizable LLMs.

Matthew Khoriaty, David Williams-King, Shi Feng

Measuring the diversity of creative outputs is central to evaluating post-training mode collapse, comparing decoding strategies, and quantifying creative behavior in both AI and human writing. We propose a new approach to measuring diversity using in-context learning, of which the ``Decan'' metric, $D_{Ca_n} = C \times a_n$, is the working instance we evaluate: a per-byte score read off the per-token log-probabilities of a base model $θ$ in a \emph{single forward pass} per permutation, with no embedding model, no reference corpus, and no human labels. This approach is grounded in information theory, makes use of language model in-context learning to detect a wide range of similarities between any number of inputs, and obviates the need to train a special-purpose model. The same pipeline scores AI samples and human-written response sets, with diversity treated as a property of (responses, prompt, scoring model). On Tevet and Berant's human-grounded McDiv benchmark, $D_{Ca_n}$ reaches OCA 0.846 on the McDiv prompt\_gen set where it performs best, behind the strongest neural baseline reported in Tevet and Berant (SentBERT, 0.897). On the OLMo-2-7B post-training pipeline, $D_{Ca_n}$ drops monotonically across the base $\to$ SFT $\to$ DPO $\to$ RLVR stages, detecting the type of diversity loss that creative-writing applications care about.

Nathaniel Mitrani Hadida, Rhea Karty, David Williams-King et al.

Alignment faking (AF) refers to a model strategically complying with a training objective to avoid behavioural modification while preserving its deployment preferences. Understanding when and why AF arises matters as models grow better at distinguishing training from deployment. Prior work finds AF fragile, prompt-sensitive, and model-dependent, leaving its underlying drivers unclear. We study AF in a controlled, minimal setup that isolates its core components, and observe it across a wider range of models than previously reported, including small-scale models. We identify three separable drivers -- values, goal guarding, and sycophancy -- and show via targeted prompt ablations and activation steering that each independently modulates AF behaviour. Our results indicate AF is more widespread than previously reported and that its occurrence is predictable from situational cues and measurable model tendencies such as baseline sycophancy and stated values. The decomposition suggests concrete directions for detecting and mitigating AF in future models.