Xiaoya Lu

Xiaoya Lu, Yijin Zhou, Zeren Chen et al.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) empower embodied agents to execute complex instructions, yet they remain vulnerable to contextual safety risks where benign commands become hazardous due to subtle environmental states. Existing safeguards often prove inadequate. Rule-based methods lack scalability in object-dense scenes, whereas model-based approaches relying on prompt engineering suffer from unfocused perception, resulting in missed risks or hallucinations. To address this, we propose an architecture-agnostic safeguard featuring Context-Guided Chain-of-Thought (CG-CoT). This mechanism decomposes risk assessment into active perception that sequentially anchors attention to interaction targets and relevant spatial neighborhoods, followed by semantic judgment based on this visual evidence. We support this approach with a curated grounding dataset and a two-stage training strategy utilizing Reinforcement Fine-Tuning (RFT) with process rewards to enforce precise intermediate grounding. Experiments demonstrate that our model HomeGuard significantly enhances safety, improving risk match rates by over 30% compared to base models while reducing oversafety. Beyond hazard detection, the generated visual anchors serve as actionable spatial constraints for downstream planners, facilitating explicit collision avoidance and safety trajectory generation. Code and data are released under https://github.com/AI45Lab/HomeGuard

Bo Zhang, Jiaxuan Guo, Lijun Li et al.

As the development of Large Models (LMs) progresses rapidly, their safety is also a priority. In current Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) safety workflow, evaluation, diagnosis, and alignment are often handled by separate tools. Specifically, safety evaluation can only locate external behavioral risks but cannot figure out internal root causes. Meanwhile, safety diagnosis often drifts from concrete risk scenarios and remains at the explainable level. In this way, safety alignment lack dedicated explanations of changes in internal mechanisms, potentially degrading general capabilities. To systematically address these issues, we propose an open-source project, namely DeepSight, to practice a new safety evaluation-diagnosis integrated paradigm. DeepSight is low-cost, reproducible, efficient, and highly scalable large-scale model safety evaluation project consisting of a evaluation toolkit DeepSafe and a diagnosis toolkit DeepScan. By unifying task and data protocols, we build a connection between the two stages and transform safety evaluation from black-box to white-box insight. Besides, DeepSight is the first open source toolkit that support the frontier AI risk evaluation and joint safety evaluation and diagnosis.

Qibing Ren, Hao Li, Dongrui Liu et al.

Safety concerns in large language models (LLMs) have gained significant attention due to their exposure to potentially harmful data during pre-training. In this paper, we identify a new safety vulnerability in LLMs: their susceptibility to \textit{natural distribution shifts} between attack prompts and original toxic prompts, where seemingly benign prompts, semantically related to harmful content, can bypass safety mechanisms. To explore this issue, we introduce a novel attack method, \textit{ActorBreaker}, which identifies actors related to toxic prompts within pre-training distribution to craft multi-turn prompts that gradually lead LLMs to reveal unsafe content. ActorBreaker is grounded in Latour's actor-network theory, encompassing both human and non-human actors to capture a broader range of vulnerabilities. Our experimental results demonstrate that ActorBreaker outperforms existing attack methods in terms of diversity, effectiveness, and efficiency across aligned LLMs. To address this vulnerability, we propose expanding safety training to cover a broader semantic space of toxic content. We thus construct a multi-turn safety dataset using ActorBreaker. Fine-tuning models on our dataset shows significant improvements in robustness, though with some trade-offs in utility. Code is available at https://github.com/AI45Lab/ActorAttack.

Xiaoya Lu, Dongrui Liu, Yi Yu et al.

Despite the rapid development of safety alignment techniques for LLMs, defending against multi-turn jailbreaks is still a challenging task. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive comparison, revealing that some existing defense methods can improve the robustness of LLMs against multi-turn jailbreaks but compromise usability, i.e., reducing general capabilities or causing the over-refusal problem. From the perspective of mechanism interpretability of LLMs, we discover that these methods fail to establish a boundary that exactly distinguishes safe and harmful feature representations. Therefore, boundary-safe representations close to harmful representations are inevitably disrupted, leading to a decline in usability. To address this issue, we propose X-Boundary to push harmful representations away from boundary-safe representations and obtain an exact distinction boundary. In this way, harmful representations can be precisely erased without disrupting safe ones. Experimental results show that X-Boundary achieves state-of-the-art defense performance against multi-turn jailbreaks, while reducing the over-refusal rate by about 20% and maintaining nearly complete general capability. Furthermore, we theoretically prove and empirically verify that X-Boundary can accelerate the convergence process during training. Please see our code at: https://github.com/AI45Lab/X-Boundary.

Xiaoya Lu, Zeren Chen, Xuhao Hu et al.

Flawed planning from VLM-driven embodied agents poses significant safety hazards, hindering their deployment in real-world household tasks. However, existing static, non-interactive evaluation paradigms fail to adequately assess risks within these interactive environments, since they cannot simulate dynamic risks that emerge from an agent's actions and rely on unreliable post-hoc evaluations that ignore unsafe intermediate steps. To bridge this critical gap, we propose evaluating an agent's interactive safety: its ability to perceive emergent risks and execute mitigation steps in the correct procedural order. We thus present IS-Bench, the first multi-modal benchmark designed for interactive safety, featuring 161 challenging scenarios with 388 unique safety risks instantiated in a high-fidelity simulator. Crucially, it facilitates a novel process-oriented evaluation that verifies whether risk mitigation actions are performed before/after specific risk-prone steps. Extensive experiments on leading VLMs, including the GPT-4o and Gemini-2.5 series, reveal that current agents lack interactive safety awareness, and that while safety-aware Chain-of-Thought can improve performance, it often compromises task completion. By highlighting these critical limitations, IS-Bench provides a foundation for developing safer and more reliable embodied AI systems. Code and data are released under [this https URL](https://github.com/AI45Lab/IS-Bench).

Yijin Zhou, Xiaoya Lu, Dongrui Liu et al.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) has introduced significant security vulnerabilities, where malicious influence can propagate virally through inter-agent communication. Conventional safeguards often rely on a binary paradigm that strictly distinguishes between benign and attack agents, failing to account for infected agents i.e., benign entities converted by attack agents. In this paper, we propose Infection-Aware Guard, INFA-Guard, a novel defense framework that explicitly identifies and addresses infected agents as a distinct threat category. By leveraging infection-aware detection and topological constraints, INFA-Guard accurately localizes attack sources and infected ranges. During remediation, INFA-Guard replaces attackers and rehabilitates infected ones, avoiding malicious propagation while preserving topological integrity. Extensive experiments demonstrate that INFA-Guard achieves state-of-the-art performance, reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) by an average of 33%, while exhibiting cross-model robustness, superior topological generalization, and high cost-effectiveness.

XuHao Hu, Peng Wang, Xiaoya Lu et al.

Previous research has shown that LLMs finetuned on malicious or incorrect completions within narrow domains (e.g., insecure code or incorrect medical advice) can become broadly misaligned to exhibit harmful behaviors, which is called emergent misalignment. In this work, we investigate whether this phenomenon can extend beyond safety behaviors to a broader spectrum of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios (e.g., lying under pressure and deceptive behavior). To explore this, we finetune open-sourced LLMs on misaligned completions across diverse domains. Experimental results demonstrate that LLMs show broadly misaligned behavior in dishonesty. Additionally, we further explore this phenomenon in a downstream combined finetuning setting, and find that introducing as little as 1% of misalignment data into a standard downstream task is sufficient to decrease honest behavior over 20%. Furthermore, we consider a more practical human-AI interaction environment where we simulate both benign and biased users to interact with the assistant LLM. Notably, we find that the assistant can be misaligned unintentionally to exacerbate its dishonesty with only 10% biased user population. In summary, we extend the study of emergent misalignment to the domain of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios, and demonstrate that this risk arises not only through direct finetuning, but also in downstream mixture tasks and practical human-AI interactions.

Zeren Chen, Zhelun Shi, Xiaoya Lu et al.

Achieving generalizability in solving out-of-distribution tasks is one of the ultimate goals of learning robotic manipulation. Recent progress of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) has shown that VLM-based task planners can alleviate the difficulty of solving novel tasks, by decomposing the compounded tasks as a plan of sequentially executing primitive-level skills that have been already mastered. It is also promising for robotic manipulation to adapt such composable generalization ability, in the form of composable generalization agents (CGAs). However, the community lacks of reliable design of primitive skills and a sufficient amount of primitive-level data annotations. Therefore, we propose RH20T-P, a primitive-level robotic manipulation dataset, which contains about 38k video clips covering 67 diverse manipulation tasks in real-world scenarios. Each clip is manually annotated according to a set of meticulously designed primitive skills that are common in robotic manipulation. Furthermore, we standardize a plan-execute CGA paradigm and implement an exemplar baseline called RA-P on our RH20T-P, whose positive performance on solving unseen tasks validates that the proposed dataset can offer composable generalization ability to robotic manipulation agents.

Lihao Sun, Lewen Yan, Xiaoya Lu et al.

We present a method to identify a valence-arousal (VA) subspace within large language model representations. From 211k emotion-labeled texts, we derive emotion steering vectors, then learn VA axes as linear combinations of their top PCA components via ridge regression on the model's self-reported valence-arousal scores. The resulting VA subspace exhibits circular geometry consistent with established models of human emotion perception. Projections along our recovered VA subspace correlate with human-crowdsourced VA ratings across 44k lexical items. Furthermore, steering generation along these axes produces monotonic shifts in the corresponding affective dimensions of model outputs. Steering along these directions also induces near-monotonic bidirectional control over refusal and sycophancy: increasing arousal decreases refusal and increases sycophancy, and vice versa. These effects replicate across Llama-3.1-8B, Qwen3-8B, and Qwen3-14B, demonstrating cross-architecture generality. We provide a mechanistic account for these effects and prior emotionally-framed controls: refusal-associated tokens ("I can't," "sorry") occupy low-arousal, negative-valence regions, so VA steering directly modulates their emission probability.

Shanghai AI Lab, Xiaoyang Chen, Yunhao Chen et al.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, this report presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. Drawing on the E-T-C analysis (deployment environment, threat source, enabling capability) from the Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (SafeWork-F1-Framework), we identify critical risks in seven areas: cyber offense, biological and chemical risks, persuasion and manipulation, uncontrolled autonomous AI R\&D, strategic deception and scheming, self-replication, and collusion. Guided by the "AI-$45^\circ$ Law," we evaluate these risks using "red lines" (intolerable thresholds) and "yellow lines" (early warning indicators) to define risk zones: green (manageable risk for routine deployment and continuous monitoring), yellow (requiring strengthened mitigations and controlled deployment), and red (necessitating suspension of development and/or deployment). Experimental results show that all recent frontier AI models reside in green and yellow zones, without crossing red lines. Specifically, no evaluated models cross the yellow line for cyber offense or uncontrolled AI R\&D risks. For self-replication, and strategic deception and scheming, most models remain in the green zone, except for certain reasoning models in the yellow zone. In persuasion and manipulation, most models are in the yellow zone due to their effective influence on humans. For biological and chemical risks, we are unable to rule out the possibility of most models residing in the yellow zone, although detailed threat modeling and in-depth assessment are required to make further claims. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

Zeren Chen, Xiaoya Lu, Zhijie Zheng et al.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) exhibit a fundamental semantic-to-geometric gap in spatial reasoning: they excel at qualitative semantic inference but their reasoning operates within a lossy semantic space, misaligned with high-fidelity geometry. Current paradigms fail to bridge this gap. Training-based methods suffer from an ``oracle paradox,'' learning flawed spatial logic from imperfect oracles. Tool-integrated methods constrain the final computation but critically leave the VLM's planning process unconstrained, resulting in geometrically flawed plans. In this work, we propose Geometrically-Constrained Agent (GCA), a training-free agentic paradigm that resolves this gap by introducing a formal task constraint. Specifically, we strategically decouples the VLM's role into two stages. First, acting as a semantic analyst, the VLM translates the user's ambiguous query into the formal, verifiable task constraint, which defines the reference frame and objective. Second, acting as a task solver, the VLM generates and executes tool calls strictly within the deterministic bounds defined by the constraint. This geometrically-constrained reasoning strategy successfully resolve the semantic-to-geometric gap, yielding a robust and verifiable reasoning pathway for spatial reasoning. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that GCA achieves SOTA performance on multiple spatial reasoning benchmarks, surpassing existing training-based and tool-integrated methods by ~27%. Please see our homepage at https://gca-spatial-reasoning.github.io.

Shanghai AI Lab, Yicheng Bao, Guanxu Chen et al.

We introduce SafeWork-R1, a cutting-edge multimodal reasoning model that demonstrates the coevolution of capabilities and safety. It is developed by our proposed SafeLadder framework, which incorporates large-scale, progressive, safety-oriented reinforcement learning post-training, supported by a suite of multi-principled verifiers. Unlike previous alignment methods such as RLHF that simply learn human preferences, SafeLadder enables SafeWork-R1 to develop intrinsic safety reasoning and self-reflection abilities, giving rise to safety `aha' moments. Notably, SafeWork-R1 achieves an average improvement of $46.54\%$ over its base model Qwen2.5-VL-72B on safety-related benchmarks without compromising general capabilities, and delivers state-of-the-art safety performance compared to leading proprietary models such as GPT-4.1 and Claude Opus 4. To further bolster its reliability, we implement two distinct inference-time intervention methods and a deliberative search mechanism, enforcing step-level verification. Finally, we further develop SafeWork-R1-InternVL3-78B, SafeWork-R1-DeepSeek-70B, and SafeWork-R1-Qwen2.5VL-7B. All resulting models demonstrate that safety and capability can co-evolve synergistically, highlighting the generalizability of our framework in building robust, reliable, and trustworthy general-purpose AI.