Wonje Jeung

2papers

2 Papers

9.6AIOct 4, 2025Code
Rainbow Padding: Mitigating Early Termination in Instruction-Tuned Diffusion LLMs

Bumjun Kim, Dongjae Jeon, Dueun Kim et al.

Diffusion large language models (dLLMs) have emerged as a promising alternative to autoregressive models, offering flexible generation orders and strong performance on complex reasoning tasks. However, instruction-tuned dLLMs exhibit a critical vulnerability we term \texttt{<eos>} overflow: as allocated sequence length increases, responses paradoxically become shorter, collapsing into early termination or degenerating into streams of \texttt{<eos>} tokens. Although noticed in practice, this issue has not been systematically analyzed. We trace its root cause to the dual role of \texttt{<eos>} as both termination and padding, which concentrates probability mass on \texttt{<eos>} at later positions and propagates backward to trigger early termination. To address this, we introduce Rainbow Padding, a simple remedy that replaces repeated \texttt{<eos>} placeholders with a repeating cycle of distinct padding tokens, distributing probability mass and breaking \texttt{<eos>} dominance. Experiments show that Rainbow Padding substantially improves length robustness and output quality, with as few as seven padding tokens sufficient to prevent early termination. Moreover, the method integrates efficiently into existing instruction-tuned models: LoRA fine-tuning for a single epoch on minimal data yields significant improvements, making this solution highly practical. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/quasar529/rainbow-padding.

12.0CLSep 27, 2025
A2D: Any-Order, Any-Step Safety Alignment for Diffusion Language Models

Wonje Jeung, Sangyeon Yoon, Yoonjun Cho et al.

Diffusion large language models (dLLMs) enable any-order generation, but this flexibility enlarges the attack surface: harmful spans may appear at arbitrary positions, and template-based prefilling attacks such as DIJA bypass response-level refusals. We introduce A2D (Any-Order, Any-Step Defense), a token-level alignment method that aligns dLLMs to emit an [EOS] refusal signal whenever harmful content arises. By aligning safety directly at the token-level under randomized masking, A2D achieves robustness to both any-decoding-order and any-step prefilling attacks under various conditions. It also enables real-time monitoring: dLLMs may begin a response but automatically terminate if unsafe continuation emerges. On safety benchmarks, A2D consistently prevents the generation of harmful outputs, slashing DIJA success rates from over 80% to near-zero (1.3% on LLaDA-8B-Instruct, 0.0% on Dream-v0-Instruct-7B), and thresholded [EOS] probabilities allow early rejection, yielding up to 19.3x faster safe termination.