Michael Klenk

Michael Klenk

A series of recent papers raises worries about the manipulative potential of algorithmic transparency. But while the concern is apt and relevant, it is based on a fraught understanding of manipulation. Therefore, this paper draws attention to the indifference view of manipulation, which explains better than the vulnerability view why algorithmic transparency has manipulative potential. The paper also raises pertinent research questions for future studies of manipulation in the context of algorithmic transparency.

Michael Klenk

Generative AI enables automated, effective manipulation at scale. Despite the growing general ethical discussion around generative AI, the specific manipulation risks remain inadequately investigated. This article outlines essential inquiries encompassing conceptual, empirical, and design dimensions of manipulation, pivotal for comprehending and curbing manipulation risks. By highlighting these questions, the article underscores the necessity of an appropriate conceptualisation of manipulation to ensure the responsible development of Generative AI technologies.

Michael Klenk

This chapter discusses the ethics of generative AI. It provides a technical primer to show how generative AI affords experiencing technology as if it were human, and this affordance provides a fruitful focus for the philosophical ethics of generative AI. It then shows how generative AI can both aggravate and alleviate familiar ethical concerns in AI ethics, including responsibility, privacy, bias and fairness, and forms of alienation and exploitation. Finally, the chapter examines ethical questions that arise specifically from generative AI's mimetic generativity, such as debates about authorship and credit, the emergence of as-if social relationships with machines, and new forms of influence, persuasion, and manipulation.

Yanran Chen, Lynn Greschner, Roman Klinger et al.

Logical fallacies are common in public communication and can mislead audiences; fallacious arguments may still appear convincing despite lacking soundness, because convincingness is inherently subjective. We present the first computational study of how emotional framing interacts with fallacies and convincingness, using large language models (LLMs) to systematically change emotional appeals in fallacious arguments. We benchmark eight LLMs on injecting emotional appeal into fallacious arguments while preserving their logical structures, then use the best models to generate stimuli for a human study. Our results show that LLM-driven emotional framing reduces human fallacy detection in F1 by 14.5% on average. Humans perform better in fallacy detection when perceiving enjoyment than fear or sadness, and these three emotions also correlate with significantly higher convincingness compared to neutral or other emotion states. Our work has implications for AI-driven emotional manipulation in the context of fallacious argumentation.