Karim Abdel Sadek

Karim Abdel Sadek, Matthew Farrugia-Roberts, Usman Anwar et al. · cambridge, gatech

Safe generalization in reinforcement learning requires not only that a learned policy acts capably in new situations, but also that it uses its capabilities towards the pursuit of the designer's intended goal. The latter requirement may fail when a proxy goal incentivizes similar behavior to the intended goal within the training environment, but not in novel deployment environments. This creates the risk that policies will behave as if in pursuit of the proxy goal, rather than the intended goal, in deployment -- a phenomenon known as goal misgeneralization. In this paper, we formalize this problem setting in order to theoretically study the possibility of goal misgeneralization under different training objectives. We show that goal misgeneralization is possible under approximate optimization of the maximum expected value (MEV) objective, but not the minimax expected regret (MMER) objective. We then empirically show that the standard MEV-based training method of domain randomization exhibits goal misgeneralization in procedurally-generated grid-world environments, whereas current regret-based unsupervised environment design (UED) methods are more robust to goal misgeneralization (though they don't find MMER policies in all cases). Our findings suggest that minimax expected regret is a promising approach to mitigating goal misgeneralization.

Karim Abdel Sadek, Mark Bedaywi, Rhys Gould et al.

For AI systems to be useful to humans, they must understand and act in accordance with our values and preferences. Since specifying preferences is a hard task, inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to develop methods that allow for inferring preferences from observed behavior. However, IRL assumes the human to be approximately optimal. This is a big limitation in cases where the human themselves may be learning to act optimally in an environment. In this paper, we formalize the problem of learning the preferences of a learning agent: a predictor observes a learner acting online and tries to infer the underlying reward function being (initially suboptimally) optimized by the learner. We model the learner as either being no-regret, or as converging to an optimal Boltzmann policy over time. In each of these settings, we establish theoretical guarantees for various preference learning algorithms, or otherwise show that such guarantees are impossible.