Anant Shah

Krishna Dasaratha, Benjamin Golub, Anant Shah

A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging methods from network games. The main results characterize the optimal allocation of incentive pay across agents and outcomes. Incentive optimality requires equalizing, across agents, a product of (i) individual productivity (ii) organizational centrality and (iii) responsiveness to monetary incentives. We specialize the model to explore several applied questions, including whether compensation should reward individual ability or collaborativeness and how the strength of complementarities shapes pay dispersion.

Yongkang Guo, Jason D. Hartline, Zhihuan Huang et al.

Forecast aggregation combines the predictions of multiple forecasters to improve accuracy. However, the lack of knowledge about forecasters' information structure hinders optimal aggregation. Given a family of information structures, robust forecast aggregation aims to find the aggregator with minimal worst-case regret compared to the omniscient aggregator. Previous approaches for robust forecast aggregation rely on heuristic observations and parameter tuning. We propose an algorithmic framework for robust forecast aggregation. Our framework provides efficient approximation schemes for general information aggregation with a finite family of possible information structures. In the setting considered by Arieli et al. (2018) where two agents receive independent signals conditioned on a binary state, our framework also provides efficient approximation schemes by imposing Lipschitz conditions on the aggregator or discrete conditions on agents' reports. Numerical experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method by providing a nearly optimal aggregator in the setting considered by Arieli et al. (2018).

Anant Shah, Arun Rajkumar

The classical 'buy or rent' ski-rental problem was recently considered in the setting where multiple experts (such as Machine Learning algorithms) advice on the length of the ski season. Here, robust algorithms were developed with improved theoretical performance over adversarial scenarios where such expert predictions were unavailable. We consider a variant of this problem which we call the 'sequential ski-rental' problem. Here, a sequence of ski-rental problems has to be solved in an online fashion where both the buy cost and the length of the ski season are unknown to the learner. The learner has access to two sets of experts, one set who advise on the true cost of buying the ski and another set who advise on the length of the ski season. Under certain stochastic assumptions on the experts who predict the buy costs, we develop online algorithms and prove regret bounds for the same. Our experimental evaluations confirm our theoretical results.