17.0AIJun 15
Know Your Limits : On the Faithfulness of LLMs as Solvers and Autoformalizers in Legal ReasoningOlivia Peiyu Wang, Sanna Wong-Toropainen, Daneshvar Amrollahi et al.
Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve strong performance on reasoning tasks, but whether this reflects faithful logical inference or heuristic approximation remains unclear. We study this question in legal entailment by comparing three paradigms, including pure LLM classification, LLM-based Formal Reasoning, and solver-based Formal Reasoning using the Z3 SMT solver, on a re-annotated subset of ContractNLI across five LLMs. Our re-annotation reveals a systematic and measurable gap between pragmatic legal interpretation and strict formal entailment, where a substantial proportion of legally sound inferences are not formally grounded without additional unstated assumptions. While introducing formal structure improves accuracy, with LLM-based Formal Reasoning achieving the highest benchmark performance, we show that this gain does not imply faithful reasoning. We identify three recurring failure modes: scope laundering, where LLMs report solver-inconsistent classifications without executing the underlying formal reasoning, producing conclusions that appear logically grounded but are not; implicit constraint blindness, where LLMs overlook logical constraints present in formal representations; and program synthesis failures, where LLMs generate incorrect Z3 code despite structured prompting. Critically, scope laundering persists across all models, raising serious concerns about the faithfulness of LLM-based formal reasoning as a proxy for symbolic execution. These results reveal a fundamental gap between benchmark accuracy and logical faithfulness.
6.2AIMay 13
Bridging Legal Interpretation and Formal Logic: Faithfulness, Assumption, and the Future of AI Legal ReasoningOlivia Peiyu Wang, Leilani H. Gilpin
The growing adoption of large language models in legal practice brings both significant promise and serious risk. Legal professionals stand to benefit from AI that can reason over contracts, draft documents, and analyze sources at scale, yet the high-stakes nature of legal work demands a level of rigor that current AI systems do not provide. The central problem is not simply that LLMs hallucinate facts and references; it is that they systematically draw inferences that go beyond what the source text actually supports, presenting assumption-laden conclusions as if they were logically grounded. This proposal presents a neuro-symbolic approach to legal AI that combines the expressive power of large language models with the rigor of formal verification, aiming to make AI-assisted legal reasoning both capable and trustworthy, thus reducing the burden of manual verification without sacrificing the accountability that legal practice demands.
3.3AIOct 11, 2025
Follow My Lead: Logical Fallacy Classification with Knowledge-Augmented LLMsOlivia Peiyu Wang, Tashvi Bansal, Ryan Bai et al.
Large Language Models (LLMs) suffer from critical reasoning gaps, including a tendency to hallucinate and poor accuracy in classifying logical fallacies. This limitation stems from their default System 1 processing, which is fast and intuitive, whereas reliable reasoning requires the deliberate, effortful System 2 approach (Kahneman, 2011; Li et al., 2025). Since full System 2 training is often prohibitively expensive, we explore a low-cost, instruction-based intervention to bridge this gap. Our methodology introduces a novel stepwise instruction dataset that decomposes fallacy classification into a series of atomic procedural steps (simple binary questions). We further augment this with a final verification step where models consult a relational knowledge graph of related fallacies. This procedural, rule-based intervention yields a significant improvement in LLM logical fallacy classification. Crucially, the approach also provides enhanced transparency into the LLMs' decision-making, highlighting a practical pathway for Neuro-symbolic architectures to address LLM reasoning deficits.