Robert L. West

Brendan Conway-Smith, Robert L. West

This paper investigates the computational mechanisms underlying a type of metacognitive monitoring known as detached mindfulness, a particularly effective therapeutic technique within cognitive psychology. While research strongly supports the capacity of detached mindfulness to reduce depression and anxiety, its cognitive and computational underpinnings remain largely unexplained. We employ a computational model of metacognitive skill to articulate the mechanisms through which a detached perception of affect reduces emotional reactivity.

Brendan Conway-Smith, Robert L. West

This paper will explore ways of computationally accounting for the metacognitive threshold -- the minimum amount of stimulus needed for a mental state to be perceived -- and discuss potential cognitive mechanisms by which this threshold can be influenced through metacognitive training and meditation.

Robert L. West, Spencer Eckler, Brendan Conway-Smith et al.

This article presents a theoretical framework for adapting the Common Model of Cognition to large generative network models within the field of artificial intelligence. This can be accomplished by restructuring modules within the Common Model into shadow production systems that are peripheral to a central production system, which handles higher-level reasoning based on the shadow productions' output. Implementing this novel structure within the Common Model allows for a seamless connection between cognitive architectures and generative neural networks.

Brendan Conway-Smith, Robert L. West

There have been increasing challenges to dual-system descriptions of System-1 and System-2, critiquing them as imprecise and fostering misconceptions. We address these issues here by way of Dennett's appeal to use computational thinking as an analytical tool, specifically we employ the Common Model of Cognition. Results show that the characteristics thought to be distinctive of System-1 and System-2 instead form a spectrum of cognitive properties. By grounding System-1 and System-2 in the Common Model we aim to clarify their underlying mechanisms, persisting misconceptions, and implications for metacognition.

Brendan Conway-Smith, Robert L. West

Attempts to import dual-system descriptions of System-1 and System-2 into AI have been hindered by a lack of clarity over their distinction. We address this and other issues by situating System-1 and System-2 within the Common Model of Cognition. Results show that what are thought to be distinctive characteristics of System-1 and 2 instead form a spectrum of cognitive properties. The Common Model provides a comprehensive vision of the computational units involved in System-1 and System-2, their underlying mechanisms, and the implications for learning, metacognition, and emotion.