Oliver Makins

Asa Cooper Stickland, Jan Michelfeit, Arathi Mani et al.

LLM-based software engineering agents are increasingly used in real-world development tasks, often with access to sensitive data or security-critical codebases. Such agents could intentionally sabotage these codebases if they were misaligned. We investigate asynchronous monitoring, in which a monitoring system reviews agent actions after the fact. Unlike synchronous monitoring, this approach does not impose runtime latency, while still attempting to disrupt attacks before irreversible harm occurs. We treat monitor development as an adversarial game between a blue team (who design monitors) and a red team (who create sabotaging agents). We attempt to set the game rules such that they upper bound the sabotage potential of an agent based on Claude 4.1 Opus. To ground this game in a realistic, high-stakes deployment scenario, we develop a suite of 5 diverse software engineering environments that simulate tasks that an agent might perform within an AI developer's internal infrastructure. Over the course of the game, we develop an ensemble monitor that achieves a 6% false negative rate at 1% false positive rate on a held out test environment. Then, we estimate risk of sabotage at deployment time by extrapolating from our monitor's false negative rate. We describe one simple model for this extrapolation, present a sensitivity analysis, and describe situations in which the model would be invalid. Code is available at: https://github.com/UKGovernmentBEIS/async-control.

Olli Järviniemi, Oliver Makins, Jacob Merizian et al.

Motivated by loss of control risks from misaligned AI systems, we develop and apply methods for measuring language models' propensity for unsanctioned behaviour. We contribute three methodological improvements: analysing effects of changes to environmental factors on behaviour, quantifying effect sizes via Bayesian generalised linear models, and taking explicit measures against circular analysis. We apply the methodology to measure the effects of 12 environmental factors (6 strategic in nature, 6 non-strategic) and thus the extent to which behaviour is explained by strategic aspects of the environment, a question relevant to risks from misalignment. Across 23 language models and 11 evaluation environments, we find approximately equal contributions from strategic and non-strategic factors for explaining behaviour, do not find strategic factors becoming more or less influential as capabilities improve, and find some evidence for a trend for increased sensitivity to goal conflicts. Finally, we highlight a key direction for future propensity research: the development of theoretical frameworks and cognitive models of AI decision-making into empirically testable forms.

Oliver Makins, Orazio Angelini, Zohreh Shams et al.

AI control is a family of techniques to prevent an AI with malicious goals from subverting its operator's intent. AI Control usually studies a single agent in one trajectory, but real deployments run many agents over shared infrastructure, and the most severe risks (model-weight exfiltration, training-run poisoning) plausibly need several agents acting in concert. We initiate the empirical study of multi-agent AI control, formalising distributed attacks in which several agents jointly aim for a malicious goal. We develop FakeLab: a synthetic AI-lab codebase (9 services, 86 benign tasks, 4 attack objectives). We evaluate single agent monitoring against distributed attacks, varying the number of agents, their coordination, model capabilities and precise monitoring configuration. Our central finding is the fragmentation effect: as more agents coordinate to attack, per-agent monitoring becomes less likely to catch any of the attackers. Secondly, this is not driven by the ratio of benign to malicious code -- we argue this is likely dependent on model capability. Third, an explicit planner amplifies the fragmentation effect, raises the rate of completing the attack up to sevenfold, and mildly sharpens executors' poor monitor-theory-of-mind. Finally: a weak "trusted" monitor misses most attacks, while a stronger one cuts undetected success by more than an order of magnitude but remains imperfect. We are happy to share FakeLab, our control setting, with safety researchers on request.